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Abdication Through Enforcement
SHALINI BHARGAVA RAY*
Presidential abdication in immigration law has long been synonymous with the
perceived nonenforcement of certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. President Obama’s never-implemented policy of deferred action, known as
DAPA, serves as the prime example in the literature. But can the President abdicate
the duty of faithful execution in immigration law by enforcing the law, i.e., by
deporting deportable noncitizens? This Article argues “yes.” Every leading theory
of the presidency recognizes the President’s role as supervisor of the bureaucracy,
an idea crystallized by several scholars. When the President fails to establish
meaningful enforcement priorities, essentially making every deportable noncitizen a
priority, and resources for enforcement are insufficient to achieve full enforcement,
the President de facto delegates that discretion to the rank and file without requisite
constraints. In so doing, the President abdicates this supervisory role, producing
abdication through enforcement.

* Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. For helpful comments on
drafts of this paper, I thank Ava Ayers, Nicholas Bagley, Blake Emerson, Laila Hlass, Eisha
Jain, Anil Kalhan, Jennifer Lee Koh, Sophia Lee, Ronald Krotoszynski, Nicholas Parrillo,
Shruti Rana, Carrie Rosenbaum, Daiquiri Steele, Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, and the
participants in the 2020 Administrative Law New Scholarship Roundtable. Chisolm
Allenlundy, Miranda Ronnow, Josie Rykhus, and Anna Saggio provided excellent research
assistance. I am also grateful to the editors of the Indiana Law Journal for their valuable
editorial assistance.

1326

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:1325

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1326
I. THE PRESIDENT IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ............................................ 1329
A. FAITHFUL EXECUTION AND THE PRESIDENT’S ROLE AS SUPERVISOR OF THE
BUREAUCRACY .................................................................................... 1331
B. PRESIDENTIAL SUPERVISION IN IMMIGRATION LAW .............................. 1337
II. DISCRETION AND ABDICATION IN IMMIGRATION LAW .................................... 1341
A. HISTORY OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION .............................................. 1342
B. NONENFORCEMENT AS A VIOLATION OF FAITHFUL EXECUTION ............ 1348
1. FALLACY OF FULL ENFORCEMENT ................................................ 1348
2. RULE-LIKE, CENTRALIZED CONSTRAINTS ON ENFORCEMENT
DISCRETION: ABDICATION OR FAITHFUL EXECUTION? ................ 1351
C. ENFORCEMENT AS A VIOLATION OF FAITHFUL EXECUTION ................... 1354
1. THE CONCEPT OF THE “QUALITY” OF A DEPORTATION UNDERGIRDS
ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION ......................................................... 1356
2. THE COMPLETE DEVOLUTION OF DISCRETION .............................. 1358
3. ZERO TOLERANCE ......................................................................... 1360
A. PUNISHING COMPLIANT CONDUCT ............................................... 1361
B. FOLLOWING A HIDDEN DATA TRAIL ............................................. 1363
4. OBJECTIONS................................................................................... 1367
III. RE-IMAGINING FAITHFUL EXECUTION IN IMMIGRATION LAW ....................... 1371
A. PROCEDURAL FAITHFULNESS ................................................................. 1371
B. SUBSTANTIVE FAITHFULNESS ................................................................ 1372
C. ENFORCEABILITY ................................................................................... 1373
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 1374
INTRODUCTION
The President has a critical role in enforcing federal immigration law. As the
nation’s chief executive, the President has the duty to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”1 Pursuant to this duty, the President oversees the immigration
bureaucracy, appointing the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security.
Under 6 U.S.C. § 202, the DHS Secretary is responsible for establishing enforcement
priorities to guide rank and file officers’ inevitable exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. Although scholars sharply debate the scope of presidential power and its
textual foundations, on any leading theory of presidential power, the President plays
an important supervisory role, especially in immigration enforcement.
In recent years, however, immigration enforcement has lacked any trace of the
President’s supervision. The Trump Administration’s immigration enforcement
priorities formally focused on “criminal aliens” but functionally included nearly all

1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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deportable noncitizens.2 According to this approach, “Everyone [i]s a [p]riority.”3
Buttressing this regime of blanket enforcement, the Department of Homeland
Security under Trump declined to identify exempt classes of deportable noncitizens
or even specify what equities might warrant an exercise of discretion.4 As a result,
line officers apprehended deportable noncitizens wherever and whenever they
encountered them. No one was exempt, and commentators almost uniformly
described that style of enforcement as “indiscriminate.”5 In failing to establish
meaningful enforcement priorities and methods to promote compliance, President
Trump functionally delegated an unconstrained discretion to the rank and file. This
created an enforcement culture ripe for racial discrimination6 and the pursuit of so-

2. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/30/2017-02102/enhancing-public-safety
-in-the-interior-of-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/XP64-TCV8] (establishing enforcement
priorities). For an argument that these priorities render everyone a priority, see Dara Lind,
Fear Itself: Donald Trump’s Real Immigration Policy, VOX, https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2017/9/14/16293906/trump-immigration-deportation [https://perma.cc/PV4NUE3L] (Sept. 29, 2017, 10:27 AM) (noting that provision prioritizing aliens who “have
committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal offense” would include all unauthorized
immigrants who have driven a car in states that do not provide them with driver’s licenses);
The End of Immigration Enforcement Priorities Under the Trump Administration, AM.
IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research
/immigration-enforcement-priorities-under-trump-administration
[https://perma.cc/JLR9QBNV] (arguing that ICE statistics combine noncitizens with criminal convictions along with
those charged with crimes, including traffic offenses, thus rendering the focus on “criminal
aliens” illusory).
3. SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BANNED: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE TIME OF
TRUMP 29 (2019) [hereinafter WADHIA, BANNED]; see also Hiroshi Motomura, Arguing About
Sanctuary, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 435, 464 (2018) (noting that the Trump Administration
encouraged “rogue enforcement” by “declar[ing] virtually all potentially removable
noncitizens to be enforcement priorities in broad and ambiguous language,” including
noncitizens “who [i]n the judgment of an immigration officer . . . pose a risk to public safety
or national security”).
4. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, supra note 2; Memorandum from
John Kelly, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to
Serve the National Interest (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files
/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-NationalInterest.pdf [https://perma.cc/H44R-HC8M] (“[T]he Department no longer will exempt
classes or categories of removable aliens from potential enforcement.”).
5. See, e.g., Eisha Jain, The Interior Structure of Immigration Enforcement, 167 U. PA.
L. REV. 1463, 1490 (2019) (describing effects of “indiscriminate interior enforcement[]”);
Jamelle Bouie, ICE Unbound, SLATE (Jan. 29, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics
/2018/01/ice-is-out-of-control.html [https://perma.cc/Z46A-JW3C]; see also Elliot Spagat, AP
Fact Check: Trump’s Aggressive Immigration Enforcement, AP (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://apnews.com/c043b0acf454439aa648080fb1a3f2a9/AP-FACT-CHECK:-Trump'saggressive-immigration-enforcement [https://perma.cc/3LBL-NH4E] (discussing then-deputy
director of ICE Thomas Homan’s statement denying “indiscriminate” enforcement, but
revealing that more immigrants without criminal histories were being swept up by immigration
enforcement under Trump than under Obama).
6. Motomura, supra note 3, at 465 (labeling current enforcement culture as “rogue by
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called low-hanging fruit.7 In a world where full enforcement is a fantasy and an
abhorrent idea to many, such an approach to enforcement—undertaken in the name
of “faithful execution of the immigration laws”8—calls for careful scrutiny.
This Article analyzes blanket enforcement and related approaches in immigration
law against the demands of faithful execution. Drawing on a burgeoning scholarship
on “good faith constitutionalism”—which construes the Constitution’s Take Care
Clause in light of the fiduciary duties of agents to principals in private law—as well
as on recent scholarship on the President’s role in supervising the bureaucracy and
overseeing enforcement, this Article contends that the President’s failure to
adequately guide and constrain line officers’ discretion amounts to abdication in
violation of this duty of faithful execution. Faithful execution requires robust
guidance for those who carry out the actual work of enforcing the laws, including
meaningful enforcement priorities and, in appropriate circumstances, the
specification of temporarily exempt classes.
This Article further contends that extreme centralization of discretion in the form
of literalism or “zero tolerance” also falls short of faithful execution. On its face, a
zero-tolerance policy that requires rank and file officers to apprehend and deport
every deportable noncitizen encountered, regardless of individual equities, looks like
a highly centralized, supervised exercise of enforcement discretion—line officers
lack discretion not to take enforcement action on a case-by-case basis.9 They are
tasked with enforcing the letter of the law. But this view conflates centralization with
supervision and ignores enforcement realities. When resources for enforcement are
limited, extreme literalism merely pushes discretion back to the realm of surveillance
and investigation. Although line officers must apprehend every deportable noncitizen
encountered, line officers will not encounter them all: which deportable noncitizens
the line officers encounter will depend on where and how line officers look.
Discretion does not disappear; rather, it migrates, further undermining transparency
and accountability. Thus, an empty-shell view of “faithfulness” as centralization
alone lacks merit.
The debate over faithful execution in immigration law has almost exclusively
focused on the deliberate nonenforcement of statutes. President Obama’s perceived
nonenforcement of certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)

design” and explaining that it “risk[s] undetected or unremedied discrimination because
enforcement decision-making is not transparent”). Motomura further notes that the “vast
discretion exercised by low-level officers” in immigration law mirrors concerns about overpolicing in communities of color more generally. Id.
7. Adolfo Flores, The Trump Administration Is Going After “Lowest Hanging Fruit” to
Boost Deportations, Ex-ICE Director Says, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 28, 2017), https://www
.buzzfeednews.com/article/adolfoflores/trump-administration-deportations [https://perma.cc
/5XKT-4WBY] (noting that ICE has increased apprehensions of removable noncitizens at
routine ICE check-ins).
8. Kelly, supra note 4, at 3.
9. See Memorandum from Matthew T. Albence, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, Implementing the President’s Border Security and Interior Immigration
Enforcement Policies (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/wp-content
/uploads/icememofeb21.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZE2-TK93] (ordering ERO officers to “take
enforcement action against all removable aliens encountered in the course of their duties”).
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through Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA), a deferred action policy
that the federal courts enjoined before it could be implemented, serves as the prime
example.10 But this analysis has gotten it backward. Supervised enforcement
discretion is not only permissible but required under some circumstances. In drawing
attention to an underappreciated aspect of faithful execution, this Article identifies a
new form of presidential abdication: abdication through enforcement.
I. THE PRESIDENT IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
The President heads the immigration bureaucracy and serves as its face and as a
focal point for public accountability.11 This role follows from the President’s
responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”12 Other provisions
of Article II of the Constitution endow the President with powers and responsibilities
relevant to faithful execution, namely, the Vesting Clause,13 the Oath Clause,14 and
the Opinions Clause.15 Together, these provisions support a conception of the
President as supervisor of the bureaucracy that implements and enforces the law, a
view that several scholars to date have developed and advanced. For example, Kate
Andrias has highlighted the President’s underappreciated role in overseeing or
directing administrative enforcement.16 Similarly, Gillian Metzger has argued that
the Take Care Clause, due process, and general separation of powers principles all
support a constitutional duty to supervise, although that duty is not exclusively the
President’s.17

10. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care
Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013) (arguing that the “Take Care Clause imposes on the
President a duty to enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all situations and
cases” (emphasis in original)).
11. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2333–34
(2001) (quoting Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95 (1985)); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 640
(1984) (“There remains a single President as the politically responsible head of lawadministration.”).
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
13. Id. § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America.”).
14. Id. § 1, cl. 8 (“Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the
following Oath or Affirmation: . . . ‘I will faithfully execute the Office of the President of the
United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution
of the United States.’”).
15. Id. § 2, cl. 1; see Tara Leigh Grove, Presidential Laws and the Missing Interpretive
Theory, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 877 (2020) (discussing the Oath and Opinions Clauses).
16. Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1031 (2013).
17. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1925
(2015); see also Ming H. Chen, Administrator-in-Chief: the President and Executive Action
in Immigration Law, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 347, 368 (2017) (noting that the justification for
centralizing discretion within agencies is rooted in President’s supervisory role).
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Although the President enjoys discretion as the nation’s chief executive, the
obligation of faithful execution also imposes constraints.18 On the constraints side,
scholarship on faithful execution in immigration law has generally focused on the
President’s lack of a suspension power—in other words, the lack of authority to carve
out, through nonenforcement, provisions of validly enacted statutes based on the
President’s policy objectives.19 However, recent scholarship on “good faith
constitutionalism” has broadened and deepened our understanding of the Take Care
Clause’s constraints on the President. Specifically, scholars have analyzed historical
sources and concluded that the Take Care Clause, as originally conceived, imposes
constraints on the President similar to fiduciary duties of agents to principals in
private law.20 Thus, faithful execution prohibits the President from self-dealing or
from violating the duties of loyalty or care. But the implications of presidential
supervision of the bureaucracy and the constraints of good faith constitutionalism for
intra-agency delegations of enforcement discretion have remained largely
unexplored.21
The immigration law context for this analysis of the intra-agency delegation of
enforcement discretion matters for several reasons. Although plenary power over
immigration belongs to Congress, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized the
President’s inherent authority to regulate immigration impinging on foreign affairs.22
As a practical matter, the President exercises delegated enforcement discretion
against a vast population of deportable noncitizens.23 And unlike other areas of
administrative law, where the law provides for a range of graduated sanctions like
fines or injunctive relief, immigration law formally has just one sanction:
deportation.24 As a result, line officers possess limited formal tools on the back end
to effectuate the “fine-grained” judgments that typically justify devolved
discretion.25 Accordingly, immigration law presents a unique context in which to
analyze the constitutionality of specific forms of delegated enforcement discretion.

18. See Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 1753 (2016) (discussing discretion-granting and discretion-constraining function of the
Take Care Clause).
19. See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 671, 711 (2014) (describing “a presumption against executive suspending and dispensing
powers” flowing from the Take Care Clause).
20. Evan D. Bernick, Faithful Execution: Where Administrative Law Meets the
Constitution, 108 GEO. L.J. 1 (2019).
21. Cf. Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 441 (2015)
(noting the need for intra-agency subdelegations of rulemaking authority).
22. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
23. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 475 (2009) [hereinafter Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration
Law].
24. See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1684 (2009)
(“One sanction—deportation—is the ubiquitous penalty for any immigration violation.”).
Some scholars have argued for greater use of fines in immigration law. See, e.g., Peter L.
Markowitz, Abolish ICE . . . and Then What?, 129 YALE L.J.F. 130, 143 (2019).
25. Cf. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law
Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 181 (2015) [hereinafter Cox and Rodríguez, Redux] (noting that
devolved discretion enables fine-grained judgments).
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Ultimately, this Article concludes that supervised enforcement discretion in
immigration law is not only permissible, but under some circumstances,
constitutionally required.26 The President breaches his supervisory role in
immigration law in failing to adequately guide or constrain line officers’ exercise of
enforcement discretion.
This Part explains the constitutional foundations of the President’s role in
immigration enforcement and the relevance of “good faith constitutionalism,” and it
concludes that faithful execution requires that the President or high-level agency
officials guide and constrain rank and file officers’ inevitable exercise of
enforcement discretion.
A. Faithful Execution and the President’s Role as Supervisor of the Bureaucracy
The President’s responsibility to execute immigration law follows from Article
II, which vests “[t]he executive Power” in the President.27 Scholars like Steven
Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash argue that the Vesting Clause serves as “a general
grant of the ‘executive Power.’”28 On this view, the President possesses the power to
“put federal law into effect.”29 Scholars have further argued that the Executive
possesses inherent power “to carry into execution the powers conferred upon it.”30
In a range of contexts, they note, the Supreme Court has already embraced this notion
that the Executive possesses the power to specify “incidental details necessary” to
complete a legislative scheme.31 Thus, the President can be understood to possess
“completion power.”
Others contend that the Vesting Clause merely assigns to the President whatever
executive power the Constitution elsewhere enumerates.32 Julian Mortenson has

26. See Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule
of Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58 (2015)
(rejecting argument that the Constitution requires complete decentralization of enforcement
discretion).
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
28. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570 (1994) [hereinafter Calabresi & Prakash, The President’s
Power]; Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992).
29. Calabresi & Prakash, The President’s Power, supra note 28, at 570, 580.
30. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE
L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006).
31. Id. at 2303.
32. See Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal
Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1178 (2019) (describing this view as the “CrossReference” theory); see also Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer or “The Decider”? The
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 703 (2007) (discussing
arguments that President has only a political oversight role); id. at 709 (distinguishing
supervisory from decisional authority). But see Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of
Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 716 (2003) (arguing for the view that the Vesting
and Faithful Execution Clauses designate the President as the head of law enforcement and
rejecting Lessig & Sunstein’s thesis that Congress may elect to give the President law
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recently reinvigorated the debate with a historical study of the use and meaning of
the term “executive” from the eighteenth century. He has argued for an “empty
vessel” view that executive power confers power “to bring legislated intentions into
effect, especially the laws and their intended consequences.”33 This comports with
the Supreme Court’s view of execution as the act of “interpreting a law enacted by
Congress to implement the legislative mandate.”34 On this view, the President
functions largely as an agent of Congress, and the tripartite framework set forth in
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
expounds this view.35 In that case, Justice Jackson opined that the President possesses
greatest authority when acting with the express or implied authorization of Congress
but that this authority recedes when the President “takes measures incompatible with
the expressed or implied will of Congress.”36 Even on this latter view of presidential
subordination to Congress, however, Article II identifies the President as the
exclusive officer possessing executive power.37
The President executes congressional enactments, taken to represent the “will of
the people,” but the Constitution does not require the President personally (and
impossibly) to execute all laws alone. To accomplish this task of law execution, the
President may enlist others.38 Even if the President does not control the entire
bureaucracy or control it completely, the President sits at its head, and the
Constitution expressly grants the President the power to remove inferior officers. The
Supreme Court has recognized limits to that power, but it has not tolerated significant

enforcement powers, but it might choose to structure law enforcement in some other way as
well).
33. Mortenson, supra note 32, at 1237.
34. Id. at 1180 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732–33 (1986)).
35. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
36. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). But see Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 30, at
2304 (resuscitating Chief Justice Vinson’s dissenting opinion in Youngstown, which critiqued
the majority’s “messenger-boy concept of the Office”); Andrias, supra note 16, at 1113
(same).
37. Mortenson, supra note 32, at 1179 (describing “muscular[]” centralization of the
executive power in the President). Notably, even scholars who reject the notion that the
Framers intended a unitary executive support presidential control of agency discretion.
Compare Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (arguing that “the framers imagined not a clear executive hierarchy
with the President at the summit, but a large degree of congressional power to structure the
administration as it thought proper”), with id. at 119 (“[I]t would not be faithful to the original
design to permit officers in the executive branch, making discretionary judgments about
important domestic issues, to be immunized from presidential control.”).
38. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010) (“In light
of ‘[t]he impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the great business of the
State,’ the Constitution provides for executive officers to ‘assist the supreme Magistrate in
discharging the duties of his trust.’”). See also Seila L., LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,
140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020) (invalidating structure of independent federal agency that
permitted the President to remove the sole agency head only after meeting certain statutory
criteria). But see id. at 2228 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Take Care Clause “speaks
of duty not power”).
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diffusion of it, instead ruling that such diffusion violates the Vesting Clause.39 In
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, the Court
invalidated the structure of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
because board members enjoyed multilevel for-cause protection from removal by the
President.40 Specifically, the President lacked the power to remove board members
directly or to remove at will an officer who could. Instead, the Commissioners of the
SEC could remove board members only for cause, and the President could, in turn,
remove the SEC Commissioners themselves only for cause. These two levels of forcause protection, the Court determined, improperly diffused the executive power
vested in the President and precluded the President from faithfully executing the
laws.41
Unsurprisingly, scholars articulate a spectrum of views on presidential control of
administration. On one end, Prakash has argued that the Framers sought to “establish
an executive who alone is accountable for executing federal law and who has the
authority to control its administration” as a chief administrator of sorts.42 This view
recognizes that a President “must have the aid of others” to be effective43 but
maintains that the President possesses control over subordinate executive officers44
and has the authority to control agency discretion.45 Commentators have further
argued that presidential control plays a crucial role in checking agency excesses, as
agency policymakers often have incentives and tendencies to “pursue a maximalist
agenda within [their] own field of authority.”46 Under a strong unitary executive
model, the President exercises full and complete control over the work of executive
agencies.
On the other end, scholars argue that the President lacks complete control of the
bureaucracy and occupies an oversight role rather than a directive one. Cass Sunstein
and Lawrence Lessig contend that the Framers distinguished executive power from
administrative power.47 On their view, when the Framers vested the executive power
in the President, they did not necessarily vest the President with full control over all
law administration. Instead, Sunstein and Lessig conclude that the Framers preserved
“a large degree of congressional power to structure the administration as it thought
proper.”48 Similarly, Peter L. Strauss has described the President’s oversight as less
than “rigorous” on account of the very limited arena in which the President exerts
direct control over personnel.49 Strauss instead characterizes the President as the

39. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484 (holding that multilevel protection from removal
for agency board members violated the Vesting Clause).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the
President’s Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 991–92 (1993).
43. Prakash, supra note 32, at 719.
44. Id. at 706–07.
45. Prakash, supra note 42, at 992.
46. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive,
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 265 (2010).
47. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 37, at 39.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Strauss, supra note 11, at 590.
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figurehead for an “enormous bureaucracy” staffed principally by civil servants with
job tenure, deep knowledge of the statutory constraints within which they operate,
and “strong views of the public good in the field in which they work.”50 Structured
in this way, “the bureaucracy constitutes an independent force.”51
Even on this latter theory, however, the President still serves as the leader and
public face of the bureaucracy. Strauss regards the Framers’ choice of a single
executive, rather than an executive committee, as a “fundamental structural
judgment,” one that supports the President’s role as “the politically accountable head
of government.”52 Then-Professor Elena Kagan has argued that presidential
administration has deep roots regardless of one’s underlying theory of the
presidency. She observes, “[T]he President has natural and growing advantages over
any institution in competition with him to control the bureaucracy. The Presidency’s
unitary power structure, its visibility, and its ‘personality’ all render the office
peculiarly apt to exercise power in ways that the public can identify and evaluate.”53
Kagan further echoes Jerry Mashaw’s argument that bureaucracy has “a democratic
pedigree purer than even Congress’s” due to the President’s role as head of
administration.54 Thus, on most leading theories of the presidency, the President has,
at a minimum, a duty to oversee the bureaucracy.55
As head of the bureaucracy, the President has the duty to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.”56 Scholars and jurists interpret the Take Care Clause as a
source of the President’s prosecutorial discretion, among other powers and
responsibilities.57 In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court ruled that “an agency’s

50. Id. at 586.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 599–600. Blake Emerson argues that departments constitute distinct units within
the Executive Branch that do more than the bidding of Congress or the President. Blake
Emerson, The Departmental Structure of Executive Power: Subordinate Checks from Madison
to Mueller, 38 YALE J. REGUL. 90, 97 (2021). They impose constraints on the political
leadership through norms developed over time, transcending “any particular officeholder.” Id.
at 119. A robust departmental structure, however, does not necessarily undermine the
supervisory role of the President. Instead, it conceives of supervision as “managerial” rather
than directive. Id. at 98 n.50.
53. Kagan, supra note 11, at 2332. Even if one rejects the unitary executive thesis, she
argues, Congress has “left more power in presidential hands than generally is recognized.” Id.
at 2251.
54. Id. at 2334; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the
Traditions of Administrative Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1972 (2015).
55. Sunstein and Lessig tout the normative appeal of a hierarchically organized
bureaucracy under presidential control, even if such a structure is unsupported by history. See
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 37, at 3, 4 (describing benefits of a strong unitary executive
model).
56. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
57. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 1835, 1837 (2016); Price, supra note 19, at 697–98; Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial
Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489, 517 (2017)
(noting that scholars and jurists cite the Take Care Clause as a source of the President’s
prosecutorial discretion, even though “the language of the Take Care Clause reads more
naturally as a command than a grant of power”).
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refusal to institute proceedings” constitutes an exercise of the Executive’s
prosecutorial discretion, “inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the
Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”58 Similarly, in
United States v. Armstrong, the Supreme Court characterized the Executive’s
prosecutorial discretion as the “‘special province’ of the Executive.”59
Recent scholarship has delved deeper into historical sources for insight on the
meaning of faithful execution. Evan Bernick has interpreted the Take Care Clause to
embody the fiduciary duties that agents owe principals in fiduciary law, with “the
people” being the principals, and the President their agent.60 As with every scenario
in which agents’ interests may diverge from those of the principal, and the principal
lacks the ability to perfectly monitor the agents’ discretion, “[h]igh agency costs
loom . . . .”61 As in fiduciary law, duties of good faith in constitutional law seek to
cabin these agency costs by constraining public officials.62 Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib,
and Jed Shugerman have similarly advanced an originalist interpretation of the
Clause as embodying fiduciary duties, such as the duty of loyalty, the prohibition on
self-dealing, and the duty of care.63 On this view, “faithfulness” depends on the
coherence of executive action with legislative will, and the “faithful execution”
clauses impose substantive constraints on executive power. Others have argued that
“faithfulness” demands that an exercise of discretion “be tethered to a good-faith
interpretation of the underlying statute.”64 Finally, scholars have emphasized that the
Executive’s task of “realiz[ing] a legislative command” would be “inconsistent with
an inherent power to dispense with or suspend law.”65 Thus, declining to enforce a
statute or particular provisions in order to functionally amend the statute violates the
duty of faithful execution.66 Nonetheless, this prohibition on suspension does not
fully describe the President’s duties, for there will often be more than one way to
“fulfill congressional preferences.”67 As a result, the President must make political
and value judgments about how to enforce the law, but the President must not act
ultra vires or act as a lawmaker by suspending validly enacted laws. Accordingly, an
executive action undertaken opportunistically, or perhaps to express animus, would
run afoul of the fiduciary duties implicit in the Take Care Clause.68

58. 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
59. 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832).
60. Bernick, supra note 20, at 23.
61. Id. at 24.
62. Id.
63. Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and
Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2188–89 (2019). But see David E. Pozen, Constitutional
Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 908 (2016) (noting Court’s failure to recognize duty of
good faith under the Take Care Clause).
64. Bellia, supra note 18, at 1788–89.
65. Andrias, supra note 16, at 1039.
66. Kent et al., supra note 63, at 2185.
67. Andrias, supra note 16, at 1039.
68. Bernick, supra note 20, at 66; see also Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV.
31, 92 (2017) (“The Take Care Clause’s obligation of faithfulness offers a textual basis upon
which to anchor the obligations of interpretive good faith and honesty.”).
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The Constitution further requires the President to take an “Oath or Affirmation . .
. ‘[to] faithfully execute the Office of the President of the United States’” and swear
or affirm to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution” to the best of his ability.69
These clauses have generally been read to mean that the President must apply skill
and judgment to “faithfully” undertake these executive duties rather than function
merely as an enforcement automaton.70 Thus, for example, the Constitution grants
the President a right to seek information from executive officers and to suggest to
Congress measures for its consideration.71 Combined with the Opinions Clause, 72
which permits the President to require executive officials to offer their opinions,
Article II paints a picture of a well-informed President at the helm of an organized,
capable bureaucracy.73
A robust concept of faithful execution includes or even centers this notion of
supervision of the bureaucracy.74 In executing congressional enactments, the
President exercises some power as a policymaker and as an overseer and organizer
of agency efforts. As a supervisor, the President has a duty to prevent others—such
as low-level bureaucrats—from undermining faithful execution through
“maladministration of the law.”75 The Take Care Clause’s articulation of
“presidential oversight” and its obligatory quality further suggests “hierarchical
oversight” by the President of subordinates.76 In Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme
Court emphasized the removal power as a core method for supervising the
bureaucracy. Chief Justice John Roberts noted that diffusing removal authority

69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
70. See Sohoni, supra note 68, at 82 (arguing that “enforcing the letter of the law to an
overly literal degree” can undermine “custom, . . . legislative expectations, and . . .
constitutional values”); Price, supra note 19, at 696–97 (“[T]he very separation of legislative
and executive functions implies that enforcing the laws may be a matter of judgment, a task
of applying general laws appropriately—‘faithfully’—in particular factual circumstances [,
rather than robotically].”); Bernick, supra note 20, at 42 (noting that predecessor provision to
the Take Care Clause was revised to remove requirement that President be “a kind of law
enforcement automaton”).
71. Article II, Section 3 requires the President to update Congress on the State of the
Union “and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient.” U.S. CONST. art. II., § 3.
72. Article II, Section 2 permits the President to “require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties
of their respective Offices.” Id. § 2, cl. 1. It further authorizes the President to “fill up all
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate” under certain circumstances. Id.
cl. 3.
73. See Strauss, supra note 11; see also Metzger, supra note 17, at 1856 (“The President
today plays a central lawmaking role, spurred by multiple causes, including the birth of the
modern national administrative state; new economic, social, and global realities; divided
government and changed political practices.”). Anne Joseph O’Connell notes that the
President has a “mandatory duty” to fill vacancies in Senate-confirmed positions, even if no
court has ever required the President to “staff vacant offices.” Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant
Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 984 (2009).
74. See Metzger, supra note 17.
75. Id. at 1877.
76. Id. at 1879.
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through multilevel for-cause protections means that the President “is not the one who
decides whether Board members are abusing their offices or neglecting their duties.
He can neither ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, nor be held responsible
for a Board member’s breach of faith.”77 Moreover, a scheme that entrusts another
officer to evaluate Board members’ performance amounts to an impermissible
delegation of this supervisory role: “This violates the basic principle that the
President ‘cannot delegate ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to
supervise that goes with it,’ because Article II ‘makes a single President responsible
for the actions of the Executive Branch.’”78 In describing presidential supervision as
an “active obligation,” the Court hinted at possible constraints on intra-agency
delegations. Without endorsing a strong unitary executive model of executive power,
a statutory delegation to an executive agency head, such as the Department of
Homeland Security, nonetheless “usually should be read as allowing the President to
assert directive authority . . . over the exercise of the delegated discretion.”79 Andrias
argues that a weaker concept of execution creates, in Chief Justice Fred Vinson’s
words, a “messenger-boy concept of the [President’s] Office.”80 As a result, the grant
of executive power “must include the authority to supervise enforcement.”81 In this
way, the power to supervise underlies most conceptions of presidential
administration, and on a range of conceptions, presidential supervision constitutes
not only a power but also a duty.
B. Presidential Supervision in Immigration Law
The larger debates over the scope of executive power notwithstanding, the
President plays an important role in policymaking, enforcement, and supervision in
immigration law specifically. Congress has broad authority to regulate immigration,
particularly to establish the grounds of inadmissibility and removability.82 But

77. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010).
78. Id. at 496–97 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712–13 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
79. Kagan, supra note 11, at 2250–51.
80. Andrias, supra note 16, at 1113; see also Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 30, at
2304.
81. Andrias, supra note 16, at 1046.
82. This authority is often attributed to the so-called plenary power doctrine, which the
Supreme Court established in the nineteenth century. Chae Chan Ping v. United States
(Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). Scholars and jurists have debated the bounds
of Congress’s plenary power, and courts generally recognize an exception for procedural due
process claims. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 259 (1984). A separate debate focuses on the
question of what exactly constitutes immigration law, thereby triggering plenary power, versus
laws that simply affect immigrants. See Emma Kaufman, Segregation by Citizenship, 132
HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1436 (2019) (arguing for treating “rules on entry, exit, and naturalization”
as migration control, and thus more easily cast within Congress’s plenary power over
immigration). But cf. Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 341, 343 (2008) (arguing that laws that concern entry (selection) and post-entry conduct
(regulation) both work to shape incentives to enter or depart the United States).
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Congress does not regulate immigration on its own. In their groundbreaking work,
Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez reject the narrative that casts Congress as the
“principal” in immigration law and the President as its “faithful agent.”83 Instead,
they reveal the President’s essential policymaking role in immigration law, both as a
matter of actual practice and of constitutional design.84
The President’s delegated discretion has slowly accreted, creating “a world of
pervasive delegation” and creating a substantial screening authority for the
President.85 Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress defined a staggering
array of strict grounds of admission and deportation, but it has never allocated
resources sufficient to deport all persons rendered deportable on these grounds.86 Cox
and Rodríguez argue that the INA has essentially delegated authority to the President
to establish immigrant screening policy “by making a huge fraction of noncitizens
deportable at the option of the Executive.”87 Moreover, Congress has acquiesced for
years, sometimes expressly and in writing, to the use of executive discretion in
immigration law.88 As Cox and Rodríguez argue, this state of affairs has created a
vast “de facto delegation” of discretion to the President, who chooses whom to
pursue, effectively shaping the immigrant labor force or tolerating the presence of
immigrants with minor criminal convictions.89 This has created a new norm in which
immigrants, if they ever acquire secure status, occupy a lengthy “probationary”
period before doing so.90 Thus, given the particular makeup of the INA and his
constitutional role, the President functions as far more than Congress’s mere agent
in immigration law. These unique conditions complicate the basic notion that
executing laws means carrying out “the will of others—of the legislature, and
ultimately of the people.”91 In immigration law, carrying out the “legislative will” as
it currently stands necessarily requires the President to make policy judgments.92

83. Cox & Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 23, at 42; see also
Ginsburg & Menashi, supra note 46, at 265; Metzger, supra note 17, at 1898 (describing
Congress and the President as two political principals).
84. Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 25, at 160 (locating the President’s
policymaking power in the Take Care Clause); see also Andrias, supra note 16, at 1114 (“From
the founding, the prevailing view was that the executive power ‘necessarily included some
measure of executive discretion “to fill in the details” in implementing legislation.’”).
85. Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 25, at 511.
86. By “deportable,” I mean both noncitizens who are inadmissible under INA § 212 and
those who are removable under INA § 237. Throughout, I use the term “deportable” to cover
both grounds.
87. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 23, at 463.
88. See Marjorie S. Zatz & Nancy Rodriguez, The Limits of Discretion: Challenges and
Dilemmas of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Enforcement, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
666, 671 (2014) (describing letter that twenty-eight members of Congress sent to Attorney
General Janet Reno and INS Commissioner Doris Meissner “affirming their sense that the
1996 laws did not erase all elements of discretion”).
89. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 23, at 464.
90. ADAM B. COX & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, THE PRESIDENT AND IMMIGRATION LAW 90
(2020).
91. Andrias, supra note 16, at 1113 (quoting HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE
PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER 2 (1989)).
92. See Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 25, at 196 (noting the difficulty of discerning
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Congress and the Supreme Court both recognize the inevitability of enforcement
discretion.93 Under 6 U.S.C. § 202, Congress recognizes this reality and vests the
DHS Secretary with responsibility for articulating enforcement priorities.94 The
Supreme Court has similarly acknowledged the permissibility of nonenforcement
decisions by the federal government. In Arizona v. United States, the Court noted
that “[a] principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by
immigration officials. Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it
makes sense to pursue removal at all.”95 Here, Justice Kennedy alluded to
considerations apart from cost that might justify nonenforcement, i.e., the notion that
removal simply might not “make[] sense.”96 For example, humanitarian
considerations might justify a showing of lenience.
Relevant authority suggests expansive but not unlimited latitude. In Heckler v.
Chaney, discussed supra, the Court held that a decision to decline to enforce a statute
against a specific defendant is generally ineligible for judicial review.97 Such a
decision springs from an agency’s prosecutorial discretion. Heckler, however,
reserved the question of whether APA review would be available where an agency
“has ‘consciously and expressly adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme as to
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”98
The latitude not to enforce implies discretion to select which enforcement actions
to bring. Along these lines, Congress has precluded judicial review of a range of

coherent enforcement priorities from the INA).
93. See Zatz & Rodriguez, supra note 88, at 679 (“Realistically, discretion is inevitable—
ICE officers could not detain and deport 11 million unauthorized immigrants.”). Today, nearly
11 million undocumented immigrants live in the United States, a figure that does not even
represent the full deportable population because it excludes legal permanent residents who
have committed deportable offenses. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW RSCH.
CTR., U.S. UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT TOTAL DIPS TO LOWEST LEVEL IN A DECADE (2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2018/11/27/u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-total-dips-tolowest-level-in-a-decade/ [https://perma.cc/9DF8-43C3]. About two-thirds of undocumented
immigrants have resided here for more than ten years. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel
& D’Vera Cohn, 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12,
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/12/5-facts-about-illegal-immigrationin-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/YD9Y-E8F6]. However, the government has resources to deport
“only” a few hundred thousand immigrants per year. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC.,
FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF 33 (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications
/DHS%20BIB%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CW5-CYZJ] (“In FY 2017, ICE removed
226,119 illegal aliens.”).
94. 6 U.S.C. § 202.
95. 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012) (citation omitted).
96. Id.; see also Jason A. Cade, Judging Immigration Equity: Deportation and
Proportionality in the Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029, 1043 (2017) (“Justice
Kennedy’s language acknowledges that not all noncitizens made deportable by Congress are
similarly situated and that executive enforcement officials should weigh individual equities in
determining the appropriateness of removal in particular cases.”).
97. 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985).
98. Id. at 833 n.4 (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
Commentators have noted that agency underenforcement rarely amounts to total
nonenforcement in satisfaction of the abdication exception. See Jentry Lanza, Note, Agency
Underenforcement as Reviewable Abdication, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1171, 1182 (2018).
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decisions in immigration enforcement. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), except for claims
relating to habeas corpus provisions, “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any alien . . . .”99 In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, the Supreme Court held that this provision barred review of a selective
prosecution claim.100 The Court expounded on the special strength in the immigration
context of standard justifications for prosecutorial discretion. In addition to the
routine concerns for giving the Executive the leeway to balance a range of factors
and the potential for a chilling effect on law enforcement, the possibility of delay and
of “an ongoing violation” of U.S. immigration law loomed large in the Court’s
reasoning.101 But the insulation of some discrete enforcement decisions from review
does not mean an enforcement policy necessarily would be so insulated.102
Finally, the President has a heightened responsibility to guide and discipline line
officers in immigration enforcement because of immigration law’s crude penalty
scheme and a widespread culture of agency defiance of the President. Unlike other
areas of administration, immigration law formally imposes only one severe penalty
for most offenses—deportation.103 In practice, agency officials use a variety of
discretionary tools to limit the imposition of deportation,104 but they typically make
judgments of lenience absent regulatory guidance.105 Other agencies not only possess
a variety of tools to sanction offenders106 but also robust interpretive guidance on
using those tools.107 In addition, recent years have exposed a disconnect between the
mission of immigration enforcement as conceived by agency officials and the

99. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
100. 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
101. Id. at 490, 491 (emphasis omitted).
102. Some courts have suggested that general enforcement policies are reviewable under
the APA even though an agency’s decision to bring or not bring an individual enforcement
action is not. See, e.g., Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671, 676–77 (D.C.
Cir. 1994). In contrast to the debate about whether an agency’s enforcement priorities
constitute a general policy reviewable under the APA, this Article considers the nature of a
challenge to enforcement priorities under the Take Care Clause, were the federal courts to
deem such a claim justiciable.
103. See Stumpf, supra note 24, at 1684.
104. See BEN HARRINGTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45158, AN OVERVIEW OF
DISCRETIONARY REPRIEVES FROM REMOVAL: DEFERRED ACTION, DACA, TPS, AND OTHERS
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45158.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BQ9-BR6U].
105. Cf. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Demystifying Employment Authorization and
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases, 6 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 5 (2016) (noting
the lack of “form, fee, or public information about how to apply” for non-DACA deferred
action).
106. See, e.g., Basic Information on Enforcement, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/basic-information-enforcement [https://perma.cc/JW4JD2ZZ] (describing types of enforcement actions and associated penalties).
107. See, e.g., Water Quality Standards Variances, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/wqs-tech/water-quality-standards-variances [https://perma.cc/D4X6P6YG].
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President on the one hand and line officers on the other.108 Due to these structural
features of immigration law, rational, good-faith administration requires supervision,
guidance, and constraint at the front end.
II. DISCRETION AND ABDICATION IN IMMIGRATION LAW
The President’s supervisory role in immigration law has been challenged in recent
years on faithful execution grounds in litigation relating to President Obama’s
deferred action policies, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and the
never-implemented DAPA.109 The literature on faithful execution in immigration law
emphasizes a common theme of the perceived lack of enforcement rather than a
particular manifestation of enforcement. Given that an agency’s commencement of
proceedings against a specific deportable noncitizen is generally within the agency’s
prosecutorial discretion110 and therefore subject only to limited judicial review,111
such a focus is understandable.
This Part, however, demonstrates that the fixation on nonenforcement has
precluded proper analysis of the potential for enforcement policies to amount to
presidential abdication. Rather than challenging individual enforcement decisions,
my argument challenges the constitutionality of enforcement policies. I argue that
enforcement policies lacking meaningful constraints on line officers’ enforcement
discretion may run afoul of the President’s Take Care duty.112 I first offer a brief

108. For a discussion of the challenges President Obama faced with respect to line officers’
defiance, see Michael Kagan, Binding the Enforcers: The Administrative Law Struggle Behind
President Obama’s Immigration Actions, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 665, 685 (2016).
109. DAPA was proposed to provide deferred action to undocumented parents of U.S.
citizen or lawful permanent resident children. By an equally divided court, the Supreme Court
let stand the Fifth Circuit’s affirmance of a district court order enjoining DAPA nationwide.
United States v. Texas, No. 15–674 (U.S. June 23, 2016) (per curiam).
110. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
111. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (stating that, except for limited exceptions, such as a habeas
action, “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien
arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter”). Nonetheless,
scholars have identified a range of discretionary enforcement decisions outside the scope of §
1252(g). See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 125 (2015) [hereinafter WADHIA,
BEYOND DEPORTATION].
112. Several leading scholars have made related claims. Cox and Rodríguez reject the
notion that the Take Care Clause requires decentralized, blanket enforcement but decline to
argue that the Constitution requires its opposite, centralized, rule-like constraints on
enforcement discretion. Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 25, at 175. They write,
“Insulating low-level bureaucrats from the President . . . will not facilitate their compliance
with congressional priorities. It will simply enable them to freely pursue their own agendas.”
Id. at 196. But they reject the notion that the particular “choices embodied in DACA and
DAPA are legally required, or even that they would in all contexts be legally permissible.” Id.
at 175. Gillian Metzger articulates a fuller defense of centralized, rule-like supervision of
enforcement discretion, arguing that the full delegation of discretion to low-level officials is
“as much at odds with constitutional structure as a presidential dispensation power.” Metzger,
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history of enforcement discretion in immigration law. I then analyze claims of
presidential abdication lodged against rule-like instantiations of prosecutorial
discretion. Finally, I argue that specific styles of enforcement—which have recurred
throughout the history of immigration enforcement and transcend the Trump
Administration—amount to abdication when they involve opaque or unconstrained
delegations of discretion to the rank and file.
A. History of Enforcement Discretion
Since the creation of the Border Patrol in 1924, enforcement officials have strived
to structure enforcement discretion using “internal administrative law,”113 such as
agency guidance memoranda that establish enforcement priorities or create deferredaction policies. Congress initially housed the Border Patrol within the Immigration
Bureau in the U.S. Department of Labor.114 Low morale characterized the Border
Patrol’s early years,115 and several interests converged to limit the agency’s efficacy.
Kelly Lytle Hernández has argued that southern anxiety about “federal intervention
in southern race relations” hampered the development of federal law enforcement
across the board, including immigration enforcement.116 The development of border
patrol was thus “tempered by efforts to protect white supremacy in the southern
states.”117 In addition, powerful agribusiness interests in the southwest blocked
efforts to convince Congress to appropriate sufficient funds to border patrol.118
Against this backdrop of a weak, half-hearted investment, the Border Patrol began
its project of racial policing at the border, as Mexican identity quickly became
synonymous with illegal presence.119 The use of racial profiling, thus, has been at the
heart of immigration enforcement from the beginning—due not only to the
overwhelming numbers of deportable immigrants and limited capacity to apprehend
but also to the particular context within which border enforcement developed the
American Southwest. The Border Patrol for years struggled to forge a professional
identity, but decentralization, a lack of equipment, and an enduring lack of funding
hobbled these efforts.120

supra note 17, at 1929.
113. Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 1239, 1241 (2017) (describing immigration enforcement policies as examples of internal
administrative law).
114. KELLY LYTLE HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRA!: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. BORDER PATROL 36–37
(Earl Lewis, George Lipsitz, Peggy Pascoe, George Sánchez & Dana Takagi, eds., 1st ed.
2010).
115. JUAN RAMON GARCÍA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 116 (Leonard Doob ed., 1980).
116. HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 114, at 42.
117. Id.
118. GARCÍA, supra note 115, at 116.
119. HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 114, at 52; see also Carrie L. Rosenbaum, The Natural
Persistence of Racial Disparities in Crime-Based Removals, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 532
(2017).
120. HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 114, at 42–44 (describing disorganization and lack of clarity
regarding the Border Patrol’s authority).
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The President has played a key role in bridging the gap between congressional
mandates and enforcement reality. The President has principally relied upon
prosecutorial discretion, and the discretion to establish priorities among deportable
immigrants is almost as old as immigration law. Shobha Sivaprasad Wadhia notes
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s use of prosecutorial discretion
dates to 1909.121 In the 1917 Immigration Act, Congress provided a statutory basis
for discretion through the Seventh Proviso of Section 3.122 This proviso authorized
the Attorney General, in his discretion, to admit “aliens returning after a temporary
absence to an unrelinquished United States domicile of seven consecutive years . . .
.”123 It embodied equitable notions of a statute of limitations and honoring an alien’s
stakes and ties here in the United States.124
Advocates lobbied Congress to codify administrative relief from deportation in
the early 1930s, but to no avail. Under President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
administration, the Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, and Commissioner of the
INS, Daniel MacCormack, advocated for a statutory basis for relief from
deportation—essentially, an extension of the Seventh Proviso from exclusion to
deportation—for immigrants with U.S. citizen family members and other equities.125
MacCormack defended this proposal by appealing to the integrity of the public fisc,
which would suffer from the deportation of breadwinners. According to Mae M.
Ngai, MacCormack thus denied that equitable relief had a basis in “sentimentality.”
Although Congress declined for many years to codify discretionary relief, these
administrative agencies granted relief to many immigrants through executive
discretion.126
The 1917 Immigration Act also featured a provision that authorized the
Commissioner General for Immigration to waive the immigration laws for certain
migrants.127 The Secretary most frequently invoked this provision, the Ninth Proviso
to Section 3, to permit entry of temporary agricultural workers. Scholars have
suggested that the Ninth Proviso on its own did not authorize the President to “craft
immigration policy to address wartime labor shortages,”128 but that perhaps it
incidentally supported an exercise of inherent authority.129 Congress moved the INS

121. WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION, supra note 111, at 18.
122. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (repealed
1952).
123. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA 84 (William Chafe, Gary Gerstle, Linda Gordon & Julian Zelizer eds., 2004).
124. Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and
Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921-1965, 21 L. & HIST. REV. 69, 100 (2003); see
also Kerne H.O. Matsubara, Domicile Under Immigration and Nationality Act Section 212(c):
Escaping the Chevron “Trap” of Agency Deference, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1595, 1605 (1994)
(describing substantive basis of Seventh Proviso as making immigration law “humane”).
125. NGAI, supra note 123, at 83–84.
126. Id.
127. S. DEBORAH KANG, THE INS ON THE LINE: MAKING IMMIGRATION LAW ON THE U.S.MEXICO BORDER, 1917-1954 20 (2017); Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration
Law, supra note 23, at 487.
128. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 23, at 488.
129. Id.
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to the Department of Justice in 1940 and continued to expand the administrative
practice of hardship-based waivers for European immigrants.130
Discretionary admission and relief from removal eventually found a statutory
foundation in the INA of 1952, or the McCarran-Walter Act,131 but shortly after that
Act’s passage, the Border Patrol initiated a massive campaign against undocumented
Mexican laborers called “Operation Wetback.”132 The federal government initiated
a “military-style” campaign of mass deportation against Mexican immigrants,
regardless of possible American citizenship or legal entry.133 According to Kelly
Lytle Hernández, the Border Patrol puffed up its statistics and crafted a narrative of
a massive uptick in removals when removals for the relevant fiscal year in fact
decreased.134
The legacy of Operation Wetback was two-fold: first, it represented a surge in
border enforcement to “solve” the problem of unauthorized Mexican immigration
once and for all. The effort resulted in apprehension and removal of hundreds of
thousands of people of Mexican descent, including some U.S. citizens.135 Second, it
signaled the start of an era of reduced emphasis on border enforcement and greater
integration of the Border Patrol with other federal law enforcement agencies.136 This
approach to border enforcement led the undocumented population to grow as the
agency consistently made fewer apprehensions in the years after the surge.137
The tacit acceptance of a large number of undocumented immigrants gradually
made discretion a structural necessity rather than purely an equitable tool. The
conventional history of prosecutorial discretion starts in the late twentieth century.
In 1976, Sam Bernsen, the General Counsel of the INS Commissioner, wrote a
memorandum that defined prosecutorial discretion as “the power of a law
enforcement official to decide whether or not to commence or proceed with action
against a possible law violator,” for reasons both “practical and humanitarian.”138
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia has noted that, for many years, the agency’s Operations
Instructions identified factors to guide its use of “nonpriority status” for some cases,
or what is now known as “deferred action.”139 Agency officials canceled those
guidelines only after the 1996 amendments to the INA.140 At the conclusion of
several years of study of the agency’s use of prosecutorial discretion, and with

130. Ngai, supra note 124, at 102.
131. Ngai, supra note 124, at 88.
132. See generally GARCÍA, supra note 115.
133. HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 114, at 184–90.
134. Id. at 159.
135. Id. at 172, 173 (noting inaccuracy of routinely quoted 1.5 million number of removals
due to “statistical sleight of hand”).
136. Id. at 190, 197.
137. Id. at 174 (“After the summer of 1954, apprehensions of Mexican nationals dropped
to a fraction of what they had been.”).
138. Zatz & Rodriguez, supra note 88, at 670 (quoting Memorandum from Sam Bernsen,
Gen. Couns., Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., Opinion Regarding Service Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion (July 15, 1976), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorialdiscretion/service-exercise-pd.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6BJ-YNSW]).
139. WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION, supra note 111, at 18.
140. Id. at 21.
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guidance from the INS General Counsel, Bo Cooper, INS Commissioner Doris
Meissner issued a memorandum that identified “a range of possible actions (one of
which is deferred action) to which prosecutorial discretion may apply” for reasons
of efficiency, or cost-containment, as well as humanitarian considerations.141 Her
memorandum also identified numerous factors for line officers to consider, including
the immigrant’s status, length of residence in the United States, criminal history, and
humanitarian considerations.142 She wrote, “Managers should plan and design
operations to maximize the likelihood that serious offenders will be identified.”143
Thus, the Meissner memorandum conceded that immigration law “offenders” differ
qualitatively.
Meissner’s memorandum continued to shape how the agency exercised
prosecutorial discretion,144 and both Republican and Democratic administrations
since have formalized prosecutorial discretion to varying degrees, even amid a
transformation of the immigration bureaucracy. After the attacks of September 11,
2001, Congress dissolved the INS and created the Department of Homeland Security.
Several subagencies constitute DHS, two of which principally engage in enforcement
activity. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) focuses on enforcement at the
border,145 while Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) conducts interior
enforcement.146 Several subunits comprise ICE. Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI) is “the principal investigative arm of [DHS]” and “is a vital U.S. asset in
combating criminal organizations illegally exploiting America’s travel, trade,
financial and immigration systems.”147 In contrast, Enforcement and Removal
Operations (ERO) focuses on ordinary immigration law violations, such as
individuals who overstay visas or enter without inspection.148 Also within ICE is the
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), which consists of attorneys who
represent the government in removal hearings.149
Congress vested the DHS Secretary with authority to set enforcement priorities
for the agency.150 Although the very structure of the immigration bureaucracy

141. Id. at 24.
142. Id. at 25.
143. Id. at 24 (quoting Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigr. &
Naturalization Serv., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion (Nov. 17, 2000), https://www.aila
.org/infonet/ins-memo-on-prosecutorial-discretion [https://perma.cc/GWV3-4LK4]).
144. SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, READING THE MORTON MEMO: FEDERAL PRIORITIES
AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 9 (2010) [hereinafter WADHIA, READING THE MORTON
MEMO].
145. About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.cbp.gov
/about [https://perma.cc/7YWE-DUQ7].
146. Overview, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.ice.gov/about-ice
[https://perma.cc/UC9V-3XQP].
147. Homeland Security Investigations, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, (Mar. 8, 2021),
https://www.ice.gov/about-ice/homeland-security-investigations [https://perma.cc/9MUGP9B4].
148. Enforcement and Removal Operations, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.ice.gov/about-ice/ero [https://perma.cc/VJR6-ZN24].
149. Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T,
https://www.ice.gov/about-ice/opla [https://perma.cc/53DZ-BHU9].
150. 6 U.S.C. § 202(5).
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transformed, the practice of guiding the exercise of enforcement discretion
continued. For example, in 2005, ICE’s Principal Legal Advisor, William Howard,
directed Chief Counsels to consider the criteria he identified in his guidance
memorandum on dismissing proceedings when a deportable immigrant had an
adjustment of status application pending before CIS that “would be appropriate for
approval” by CIS.151 This guidance suggested that pursuing removal proceedings
against immigrants with meritorious applications for immigration benefits would
constitute a poor use of enforcement resources. He further underscored prosecutorial
discretion as a tool to enable the bureaucracy to “deal with the difficult, complex and
contradictory provisions of the immigration laws and cases involving human
suffering and hardship.”152 Julie Myers, the DHS Assistant Secretary and Director of
ICE, similarly issued a memorandum in 2007 reminding the rank and file of their
power to exercise discretion and the expectation that they do so “in a judicious
manner at all stages of the enforcement process.”153 She highlighted the importance
of discretion when arresting and determining whether to detain noncitizens “who are
nursing mothers.”154
Similarly, in 2010, the head of ICE, John Morton, acknowledged the practical
need to prioritize targets, noting the federal government’s capacity to deport
immigrants to be 400,000 per year, or 4% of the deportable population.155 To direct
enforcement resources most productively, he issued a series of memoranda outlining
criteria for line officers to use in determining whether to make an arrest. Specifically,
these so-called Morton Memos identified immigrants with serious criminal
convictions as priorities for removal.156 Further, the memoranda made immigrants
low priorities when they had no criminal convictions, had U.S. citizen relatives, and
had other equities.157 Additional memoranda closed certain immigration case files,
thus shielding the immigrants in question from removal but not conferring legal
status or benefits such as work authorization.158 The effect of Morton’s guidance

151. Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion to Dismiss Adjustment Cases (Oct. 6,
2005), https://www.aila.org/infonet/ice-prosecutorial-discretion-to-dismiss-adjustment [https:
//perma.cc/T2KT-WJ9Y].
152. Zatz & Rodriguez, supra note 88, at 673 (quoting Memorandum from William J.
Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t (Oct. 24, 2005), http:/
/www.scribd.com/doc/22092975/ICE-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-William-JHoward-10-24-05 [https://perma.cc/FQ9R-64ZY]).
153. Id. at 673 (quoting Memorandum from Julie Myers, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t (Nov. 7, 2007), https://www.aila.org/infonet/ice-prosecutorial-custodydiscretion-nursing-mom [https://perma.cc/56B6-AQQZ]).
154. Id.; see also Kalhan, supra note 26, at 88; Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic
Administration: Experimentation and Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1194–95 (2016)
(describing the Myers memorandum).
155. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 28 (2014).
156. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, Civil
Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens
(Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9FXB-LDWN].
157. WADHIA, READING THE MORTON MEMO, supra note 144, at 9.
158. MOTOMURA, supra note 155, at 28–29.
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remained questionable as line officers followed the guidance unevenly, and data
revealed that 45% of deported immigrants in 2012 had no criminal records.159
Line officers at best ignored the Morton Memos’ enforcement priorities and at
worst denigrated them.160 Given the uneven implementation of the ICE Director’s
guidance, and the ease with which line officers disregarded them, DHS ultimately
took a more centralized approach to supervising enforcement discretion.161 This
approach culminated in DACA, President Obama’s signature immigration policy.
President Obama’s Secretary of DHS at the time, Janet Napolitano, issued a
memorandum announcing DACA, formalizing prosecutorial discretion to a high
level162 and essentially instructing line officers, in their individual discretion and on
a case-by-case basis, to refrain from pursuing individuals who met the eligibility
criteria for DACA.163 Eligibility criteria included having entered the country under
the age of sixteen, having continuously resided in the United States for at least five
years prior to the date of the memorandum, being present in the United States on the
date of the memorandum, being enrolled in high school or achieving certain other
educational milestones, and lacking any conviction for a serious crime.164
ICE agents resented their superiors telling them to hold back. Several agents filed
a lawsuit against DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano and ICE Director, John Morton,
alleging violations of the APA, the INA, and the Take Care Clause.165 Although a
federal district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing,166 the suit remains a
symbol of the challenges that agency officials face in supervising the ICE rank and
file officers and inducing compliance with agency priorities. Fundamentally, many
line officers view their role as apprehending and removing every deportable person

159. Josh Hicks, ICE Director John Morton Stepping Down, WASH. POST (June 18, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal_government/ice-director-john-mortonstepping-down/2013/06/17/f22f6bb8-d78a-11e2-a9f2-42ee3912ae0e_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7JFY-SUQ7].
160. Zatz & Rodriguez, supra note 88, at 680 (quoting an immigration attorney’s
recollection of conversations with ICE officers to the effect that the memoranda had no effect,
and in one instance, that they were akin to “toilet paper”).
161. See Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 23, at 192;
Kalhan, supra note 26.
162. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as
Children (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24ZZ-VC8B];
Kalhan, supra note 26, at 61.
163. See Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 25, at 177–78. “As a practical matter, the
structure of DACA and DAPA significantly constrains, if not functionally eliminates, the
discretion of those adjudicating relief applications.” Id. at 180.
164. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 162.
165. Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 730–31 (N.D. Tex. 2013).
166. Id. at 743, 746.
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encountered,167 which, ironically, transforms enforcement into a robotic or
ministerial function rather than one associated with expertise, judgment, or esteem.168
B. Nonenforcement as a Violation of Faithful Execution
Discretion has a long history, but that does not insulate it from constitutional
scrutiny. Critics of immigration discretion contend that deliberate nonenforcement
of the law in any circumstance amounts to abdication of the duty of faithful
execution.169 Others take the view that only categorical, prospective rules of
nonenforcement amount to abdication, but that case-by-case exercises of
prosecutorial discretion are consistent with the president’s duties.170 This sub-Part
evaluates these arguments in turn.
1. Fallacy of Full Enforcement
Resistance to enforcement discretion often follows from the view that DHS
should deport each and every person unlawfully present or “amenable to removal.”171
Some scholars and jurists doubt claims that resource constraints justify large-scale
nonenforcement. For example, John Yoo and Robert Delahunty question the Obama
Administration’s assertion that it lacked sufficient resources to effectuate full
enforcement of the immigration laws. They note that the Administration “provided
no evidence to substantiate its claim of inadequate resources,”172 nor did it explain
the savings to ICE or consider the administrative expenses to conduct background
checks and other operational requirements of a deferred action policy.173 However,
Yoo and Delahunty do not question the possibility that resource constraints might
justify nonenforcement in individual cases,174 but rather they question the veracity of
the Obama Administration’s specific claim that a lack of resources justified the
precise deferred action policy it created, one that “dovetailed so neatly with” the

167. See Chen, supra note 17, at 395 (“More than one ICE official relayed in interviews
the anecdote that ICE officers presented with a choice between deporting the proverbial
undocumented grandmother and the undocumented murderer would go after both.”).
168. Cf. Richard M. Re, Imagining Perfect Surveillance, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
264, 287 (2016) (describing imagined shift of discretion from the executive to the legislature
in a world of perfect surveillance because the legislature would no longer rely on the executive
to “make difficult resource allocation decisions when investigating crime”).
169. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 10; Dara Lind, Jeff Sessions Gave Trump the
Immigration Crackdown He Wanted, VOX (Nov. 7, 2018, 3:49 PM), https://www.vox.com
/2018/5/23/17229464/jeff-sessions-resign-trump-immigration
[https://perma.cc/G6ZESMLA] (describing former Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s view “that the federal
government has an obligation to ‘end illegality’ in the immigration system, full stop”).
170. Price, supra note 19, at 760.
171. ENF’T & REMOVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT FISCAL YEAR 2019 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS
REPORT 12 (2019), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2019
/eroReportFY2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3SY-EGCG].
172. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 10, at 847.
173. Id. at 848.
174. Id. at 847.
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failed DREAM Act.175 Under these circumstances, some scholars accused President
Obama of evading his duty of faithful execution by substituting his policy
preferences for congressional will through the pretense of coping in good faith with
resource constraints.176
But even if one doubts a particular invocation of limited resources to justify
nonenforcement, full enforcement remains a fantasy and a fallacy when Congress
allocates resources insufficient to achieve full enforcement. As a result, discretion
inevitably permeates enforcement work, and the question arises whether enforcement
officials should openly acknowledge this reality. In his foundational work Police
Discretion, Kenneth Culp Davis argues that the police should abandon the “pretense
of full enforcement” and instead openly embrace selective nonenforcement for the
sake of transparency, due process, and accountability.177 Following interviews with
some 300 police officers in the Chicago Police Department, Davis determined that
police officers almost uniformly assume that state law requires full enforcement.178
Stemming from this belief that the law requires full enforcement, officers denied that
they make or have any kind of enforcement policy. Any such policy, even if only de
facto, must necessarily develop without community input because no official
policymaking process exists.
The reality of law enforcement, however, means that the police cannot and do not
enforce all the laws all the time. Davis lauds police, in their acts of underenforcement,
for their use of common sense and “wisdom” in the face of the full enforcement
pretense, noting that some offenders do warrant lenience.179 In the face of systemic
pressures, the legislature must either scale back the criminal code to criminalize
fewer acts, or police officers must enforce less than all the laws all the time.180 Davis
ultimately also noted a third option—that legislatures could delegate rulemaking to
the police, essentially turning the police into an administrative agency, to develop a
set of rules that would be amenable to full enforcement.181
In the absence of such delegated rulemaking authority, police enjoy only an
unofficial delegation of discretion to develop nonenforcement policy, a delegation
that they deny and over which they refuse to engage the public. Davis critiques the
lack of transparency and accountability that characterizes the police units’
development of unofficial nonenforcement policy. Moreover, this approach to
enforcement policy devolves discretion to line officers, preventing “the top officials
from making enforcement policy.”182 As a result, the public lacks truthful

175. Id. at 848.
176. Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law,
19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213, 231 (2015).
177. Kenneth Culp Davis argues that the pretense of full enforcement follows from laws
requiring full enforcement, insufficient resources for such enforcement, and “the
commonsense of some nonenforcement.” KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 54
(1975).
178. Id. at 52–53.
179. Id. at 62, 66.
180. Id. at 67.
181. Id. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia applies Davis’s analysis to exercises of immigration
enforcement discretion as well. See WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION, supra note 111, at 85.
182. DAVIS, supra note 177, at 70.
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information about operative policies, those affected lack notice, and the public
continues to be told that the laws are being fully enforced.183
Davis notes that the criminal law manifests both formally in the code, which
might, say, criminalize drinking alcohol in the park, and also informally in
enforcement patterns. Thus, “quietly drinking at a family picnic without disturbing
others is not a crime according to the reality of the law, because officers uniformly
refuse to enforce the ordinance in such circumstances.” In such instances, the police’s
enforcement policy “supersedes” the law’s formal requirements.184 Instead of this
quiet charade, Davis argues, the police should engage in rulemaking to structure their
enforcement discretion. The principal reason not to have an open, selective
nonenforcement policy is that it contradicts the pretense of full enforcement.185 Thus,
Davis argues for an open system of enforcement priorities.186 Arguing that no
reasonable legislature “could have intended that resources should be indiscriminately
used up,”187 Davis ultimately proposed open, participatory, public police rulemaking,
subject to judicial review.188 Such a proposal would not eliminate police discretion,
but it would refine it and properly control it.189 Rules would help confine, structure,
and check officer discretion.190
Multiple insights from Davis’s work apply to immigration law. First, like the
criminal law, immigration law renders many more people deportable than could ever
realistically be deported.191 Congress has created few avenues for legal entry, made
entry without inspection a deportable offense, and imposed exacting conditions on
post-entry conduct.192 As with the criminal law, these provisions are unlikely to be
scaled back anytime soon. Accordingly, the legislature has de facto delegated vast
discretion to immigration law enforcement.193 Second, in the absence of centralized,

183. Unless safety requires confidentiality, Davis contends, every policy should be subject
to public scrutiny. Id. at 77.
184. Id. at 73.
185. Id. at 78.
186. Id. at 86.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 126, 128 (regarding police rulemaking as judicially required).
189. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 141
(1976).
190. Id. at 145. Confining discretion means articulating a boundary between discretionary
and nondiscretionary judgments. Structuring discretion means that, within the realm of
discretionary judgments, those judgments should be guided by particular goals, policies, and
principles, and made pursuant to particular procedures to limit arbitrariness. Checking
discretion refers to review by a supervisor, prosecutor, judge, the press, the public, or some
other person or entity other than the officer themselves. On Davis’s view, rules do not replace
discretion, but rather, coexist to confine, structure, or check discretion. For a critique of using
rulemaking to constrain law enforcement discretion, see Maria Ponomarenko, Rethinking
Police Rulemaking, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2019).
191. See Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1129, 1146 (2016) (comparing this aspect of immigration law with criminal law).
192. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (describing classes of deportable aliens to include
those present in violation of the law).
193. Cox & Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, supra note 23, at 463
(describing “de facto delegation” of immigration enforcement discretion resulting from the
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supervised discretion, line officers are left to make judgment calls about how to direct
enforcement efforts without guidance, thus assigning them the task of making de
facto enforcement policy without any official policymaking process. Such an
approach suffers from deficits in transparency, accountability, and consistency—
core “rule-of-law” values.194
Davis’s analysis also has important limitations when applied to immigration law.
First, it seems unlikely that Congress would (or should) require DHS to formalize
enforcement priorities through notice-and-comment rulemaking when, instead, the
centralization of discretion through enforcement priorities developed in a less formal
process might achieve some of the same rule-of-law benefits.195 Second, the pretense
of full enforcement arguably does less work in debates over faithful execution in
immigration. Although a range of actors in the executive branch, the judiciary,196 and
the public have used the rhetoric of full enforcement, Congress has explicitly
acknowledged the reality of priority-setting,197 thus dampening expectations of full
enforcement in immigration law. Upon recognition of the supervisory character of
the President’s duties, however, many of the same rationales for police
nonenforcement policies apply to the President: the value of centralized discretion
by high-level officials; supervision and constraint of low-level discretionary
judgments; and a public, and therefore more transparent, process of developing
priorities for enforcement.198
2. Rule-Like, Centralized Constraints on Enforcement Discretion: Abdication or
Faithful Execution?
Scholars, advocates, and jurists have traditionally conceived of presidential
abdication in immigration law as nonenforcement of certain provisions of the INA.
The legal challenge to DACA, also alleging abdication through nonenforcement,
failed on standing grounds, but a similar challenge to a related policy, DAPA, and
an expansion of DACA, overcame the standing hurdle.199 A federal district court

existence of a “detailed, rule-bound immigration code,” rendering a vast number of
noncitizens “deportable at the option of the Executive”).
194. Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 25, at 192 (discussing “rule-of-law” value of
centralizing discretion in the form of rule-like deferred action policies). Cf. Carrie L.
Rosenbaum, Anti-Democratic Immigration Law, 97 DENV. L. REV. 797 (2020); David S.
Rubenstein, Taking Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 168, 224 (2018).
195. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 113, at 1245–46 (discussing benefits to agencies and
the public of using internal administrative law not subject to judicial review); Cox &
Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 25, at 218 (characterizing notice-and-comment rulemaking as a
“protracted multi-year” process, rendering it “unworkable” with respect to DAPA and
DACA). But see WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION, supra note 111, at 152 (arguing that DHS
should use rulemaking to regulate deferred action).
196. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration
Law, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 59 (2012) (describing Justice Scalia’s expectation of full
enforcement in his dissenting opinion in Arizona v. United States).
197. See 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (assigning task of priority-setting to the DHS Secretary).
198. See Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 25, at 224 (describing benefits of
centralization of discretionary decision making within DHS).
199. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 621–22 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (finding states
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preliminarily enjoined DAPA nationwide, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the nationwide preliminary injunction,200 and an equally divided Supreme
Court left the Fifth Circuit’s decision undisturbed.201 The Trump Administration
subsequently rescinded DAPA, and thus neither DAPA nor the expanded DACA
policy were ever implemented.202
Critics of the policy challenged DAPA on numerous constitutional and statutory
grounds. They asserted that DAPA violated the Take Care Clause, the APA’s
requirement of notice-and-comment rulemaking for legislative rules, and the APA’s
prohibition on arbitrary and capricious agency action.203 Plaintiffs argued that the
President violated the Take Care Clause by admitting that he was “changing the law”
with DAPA.204 Conceding the impossibility of full enforcement, plaintiffs strived to
distinguish DAPA from an ordinary expression of enforcement priorities.205 Rather,
plaintiffs argued, DAPA conferred benefits, such as work authorization and driver’s
licenses, upon unlawfully present noncitizens.206 Apart from changing the law, on
this view, the policies also essentially suspended a valid congressional enactment.207
Thus, the nonenforcement policy, coupled with the categorical extension of benefits
to a large class of unauthorized immigrants, amounted to abdication.208
The federal government’s analysis of the legality of DAPA originates in a
memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel to the President (OLC).209 The OLC
memorandum determined that the Take Care Clause served as a source of bounded
enforcement discretion rather than an imposition of an obligation of perfect
enforcement. It then proceeded to evaluate DAPA’s consistency with congressional

had standing due to costs of granting drivers licenses to recipients of deferred action), aff’d,
809 F.3d 134, 150 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding states’ standing “plain, based on the driver’s-license
rationale”), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016).
200. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134,
188 (5th Cir. 2015).
201. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016).
202. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Rescission of
November 20, 2014 Memorandum Providing for Deferred Action for Parents of Americans &
Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) (June 15, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default
/files/publications/DAPA%20Cancellation%20Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MQY-UGYU].
203. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 70–86, Texas v. United States, 86
F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-00254), https://web.archive.org/web
/20150402104146/https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/files/epress/files/20141203MultistateImmigrationOrderLawsuit%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/HYD6-NCHP].
204. Id. ¶ 49.
205. Id. ¶ 58.
206. Id. ¶ 61.
207. Analyzing DACA rather than DAPA, Zachary Price concludes that the program of
deferred action constituted an impermissible “categorical, prospective suspension of both the
statutes requiring removal of unlawful immigrants and the statutory penalties for employers
who hire immigrants without proper work authorization.” Price, supra note 19, at 760.
208. The Fifth Circuit, however, declined to address plaintiffs’ claim under the Take Care
Clause. Texas, 809 F. 3d at 146 n.3.
209. U.S. DEP’T JUST., Memorandum Opinion for the Secretary of Homeland Security and
the Counsel to the President, (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/file/179206/download
[https://perma.cc/U9UF-F4TT].
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priorities. It discerned a congressional intent to preserve U.S. citizens’ and lawful
permanent residents’ family unity, and it concluded that DAPA promoted that
objective.210 In addition, the memorandum noted that a more expansive policy, such
as deferred action for parents of DACA recipients, would strain fidelity to
congressional priorities and likely lack a limiting principle.211
Scholars persuasively defended the federal government’s effort to centralize and
supervise enforcement discretion. Anil Kalhan critiqued as inconsistent Judge
Hanen’s decision to enjoin DAPA out of a belief that the Constitution precludes
supervised enforcement discretion while simultaneously purporting to accept the
Executive’s power to set enforcement priorities.212 Similarly, Adam Cox and Cristina
Rodríguez endorsed “permitting politically accountable leadership to exert
supervisory authority over line-level agents.”213 They further argued that any
particular enforcement policy would have to undergo an analysis of specific tradeoffs to assess the charge of “abdication.”214 In their view, an administration must
choose between rules and standards, centralized versus decentralized discretion, and
secrecy versus transparency in the exercise of enforcement discretion.215 Thus, the
Constitution does not per se prohibit centralizing enforcement discretion in rule-like
form.
Apart from defending the mere permissibility of centralized enforcement
discretion, scholars such as Gillian Metzger argue that the Constitution requires some
level of centralized enforcement discretion.216 With respect to DAPA specifically,
she argues, “[B]y openly stating a generally applicable policy and then instituting an
administrative scheme to implement that policy, the President and DHS Secretaries
. . . were actually fulfilling their constitutional duties to supervise.”217 Although she
does not argue that the Constitution requires the particular policy embodied in
DAPA, she does suggest that the failure to create such a policy raises questions about
adequate supervision. After all, the alternative to this scheme of supervised
enforcement discretion consists of “case-by-case discretionary decisions by lowlevel officials over which meaningful supervision is very hard to exercise.”218
Metzger’s defense of DAPA captures the concerns that Kenneth Culp Davis
expressed regarding police discretion. If law enforcement officials are going to
exercise vast discretion over a large population, selective enforcement is inevitable,

210. Id. at 26.
211. Id. at 32–33. But as Cox and Rodríguez have noted, the task of discerning
congressional priorities from hundreds of pages of statutory text is a “doomed” inquiry. Cox
& Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 25, at 224. They argue that the inquiry should instead focus
on whether enforcement policies “make reasonable rule-of-law tradeoffs and thereby advance
the general purposes of the constitutional separation of powers—constraining and rendering
accountable government power.” Id.
212. Kalhan, supra note 26, at 88.
213. Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 25, at 196.
214. Id. at 213.
215. Id. at 174.
216. Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 92 (2017).
217. Metzger, supra note 17, at 1929.
218. Id.
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and the due process values of predictability, consistency, and accountability all
support the wisdom of centralizing enforcement discretion in rule-like form under
some circumstances.219 The next section considers in greater depth the relationship
of centralized enforcement discretion to faithful execution.
C. Enforcement as a Violation of Faithful Execution
The President’s supervisory role in the immigration bureaucracy, combined with
the longstanding practice of structuring enforcement discretion through enforcement
priorities, parole, deferred action, and other reprieves from removal,220 suggests
presumptive space for use of discretion as a tool of equity; but it does not authorize
a President to effectively revise or invalidate a statute through complete
nonenforcement.221 Some forms of centralized enforcement discretion, however, are
permissible. The question remains whether the President can claim to faithfully
execute the immigration laws by declining to constrain enforcement discretion and
letting the rank and file loose on any and every deportable noncitizen officers
encounter.222 This Article argues that recent policies of blanket enforcement and zero
tolerance violate the President’s duty of faithful execution. Specifically, a stated
policy that exempts no one and makes everyone a priority simply devolves discretion
to the rank and file, a regime that Hiroshi Motomura calls “rogue by design.”223 Such
a scheme does nothing to guard against race discrimination, producing a shadow,
unsupervised shield from enforcement for those whose race or appearance does not
reveal their deportability. Relatedly, a stated policy of zero tolerance in the face of
insufficient resources to attain full enforcement will simply reproduce a shadow,
unsupervised shield from enforcement for deportable noncitizens who are hard to
locate or costly to apprehend. Such policies abrogate “the active obligation to
supervise” that accompanies the President’s “ultimate responsibility . . . for the
actions of the Executive branch.”224
Other developments also support more squarely considering the faithfulness of
blanket enforcement and zero tolerance. The fixation on suspension of or
dispensation with the law has generally followed from the historical concerns of the
Framers, but recent scholarship has broadened and deepened analysis of the historical
record. Recent work on good faith constitutionalism, discussed in Part I, also
suggests that certain duties constrain enforcement policy.225 Ultimately, every

219. See DAVIS, supra note 177, at 124–25.
220. See HARRINGTON, supra note 104.
221. See Price, supra note 19, at 689; see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985);
Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653,
675–83 (1985).
222. Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement,
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1842 (2011);
Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)volving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of Secure
Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1259 (2015).
223. See Motomura, supra note 3, at 451.
224. Free Enter. Fund. v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496–97 (2015)
(quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712–713 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
225. See supra Part I.
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enforcement policy implies nonenforcement as to others, and every nonenforcement
policy implies enforcement as to others. 226 This insight, too, might diminish the
significance of the nonenforcement-enforcement distinction in abdication analysis
and lend itself to scrutiny of policies based on the fallacy of full enforcement.
The supervisory vacuum in which immigration enforcement occurred under the
Trump Administration produced chaos and resentment. Recent reporting suggests
that ICE agents hungered for appropriate guidance, and the lack of intra-agency
coordination damaged morale and mission.227 Although Trump superficially
appeared to direct agency efforts in many instances, he did so without adequate
information and input from subordinates. His attempts to direct enforcement sowed
chaos. For example, Trump’s announcement on Twitter of an upcoming mass
immigration raid caught unaware the acting Secretary of DHS, Kevin McAleenan.228
The White House had ignored McAleenan’s cautioning about the potential waste of
human and financial resources in such a campaign, as well as the concerns expressed
by McAleenan’s predecessor, Kirstjen Nielsen, former DHS Secretary, and the
former head of ICE, Ron Vitiello.229 Not only had Trump ignored the advice of the
relevant agency heads, but he cut McAleenan out entirely, coordinating directly with
the acting head of ICE, Mark Morgan. The administration then proceeded to accuse
McAleenan of leaking information about the raids, although “it was Trump who first
publicized the information about the operation.”230 Instead of serving as evidence of
a subagency director defying his boss, the episode fueled a narrative of the acting
DHS secretary “resisting what ICE is trying to do.”231 Insufficient intra-agency
guidance, supervision, and control undermined the planned raid and gave no
assurance to the public of the legitimacy or coherence of the policy.
Although ICE agents resented President Obama’s robust enforcement priorities
which they viewed as “micromanagement,” the anecdotal evidence described above
suggests that some ICE agents also resented the “chaotic” approach to enforcement
in their absence.232 In this way, line officers appear to yearn for a very different mix
of centralization and freedom. Both complete devolution and zero tolerance
eliminate necessary presidential supervision at the critical points. Notably, rather
than facilitating presidential oversight, these approaches permit the President to look
the other way.

226. Cf. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 472 (1923) (arguing that the government’s protection of a property right
coerces non-owners).
227. Jonathan Blitzer, ICE Agents Are Losing Patience with Trump’s Chaotic Immigration
Policy, NEW YORKER (June 24, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/iceagents-are-losing-patience-with-trumps-chaotic-immigration-policy [https://perma.cc/ZHL35SWY].
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. (quoting former acting head of ICE, Thomas Homan, appearing on Fox News).
232. Id.
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1. The Concept of the “Quality” of a Deportation Undergirds Enforcement
Discretion
To understand how particular enforcement policies can violate faithful execution,
one first must have a sense of the normative assumptions underlying prosecutorial
discretion in immigration law. The concept of the “quality” of a deportation lies at
the core of equitable discretion, but not everyone subscribes to it. Some take the view
that all deportations are or should be regarded as qualitatively equal. Thus, a
deportable immigrant with no criminal convictions, deep family and community ties,
and a flourishing business merits enforcement action as much as a recently arrived
deportable immigrant who has already gotten into trouble with the police. Each is
present in the United States in violation of the law. To show leniency toward the
former (or latter) would amount to something less than faithful execution of the
law.233
Others contend that the government can and should distinguish among deportable
immigrants based on the nature of their immigration offense as well as their other,
non-immigration-related conduct or their personal characteristics. Deportable
immigrants who entered as lawful permanent residents or those who entered on a
visa but subsequently overstayed may differ in important ways from those who
entered without inspection or through the use of fraudulent documents.234 Some
deportable immigrants will show all marks of a successful individual in a
community. They usually pay taxes,235 and they might marry a U.S. citizen or have
children who are U.S. citizens.236 They often know their neighbors,237 and they might
serve as the primary caregiver to a U.S. citizen relative.238 They might own a business
or make a living on wages without requiring government subsidy—all without any
arrests, convictions, or other interaction with the criminal legal system.239 The

233. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 10, at 784.
234. See Stumpf, supra note 24, at 1737–38 (distinguishing those who commit crimes from
those who “transgress[] pure immigration law”).
235. Alexia Fernández Campbell, Undocumented Immigrants Pay Millions of Dollars in
State Taxes–Even in the Reddest States, VOX (Mar. 1, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com
/2019/3/1/18241692/undocumented-immigrants-pay-state-local-taxes
[https://perma.cc
/3H6B-CB3X].
236. Vivian Yee, A Marriage Used To Prevent Deportation. Not Anymore., N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/us/immigration-marriage-green-card
.html [https://perma.cc/4NMU-GUJD].
237. Julia Jacobo, Tennessee Neighbors Form Human Chain to Prevent ICE from
Arresting Father in Driveway, ABC NEWS (July 23, 2019, 7:28 PM), https://abcnews.go.com
/US/tennessee-neighbors-form-human-chain-prevent-ice-arresting/story?id=64508277 [https:
//perma.cc/K2SC-NUCH].
238. Cristina Ritchie Cooper & Elizabeth Christy, Promising Practices When Working
with Immigrant Kinship Caregivers, AM. B. ASS’N (July 1, 2017), https://www.americanbar
.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/child_law_practic
e/vol-36/july-aug-2017/promising-practices-when-working-with-immigrant-kinshipcaregive/ [https://perma.cc/88EK-JYYR].
239. Maya Salam, Mayor Says Indiana Man’s Deportation ‘Feels Like a Defeat for Our
Community’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us
/undocumented-indiana-man-deported-trump.html [https://perma.cc/RPC9-JZ2K] (describing
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government has routinely regarded these individuals as worthy of discretion or
equitable consideration.240
Invoking this normative view of a successful or morally “good immigrant”
divides deportable immigrants into those more and less worthy of enforcement
action.241 This prompts the question: who does merit enforcement, if not deportable
immigrants with the above-described equities? Government officials commonly rely
on criminal convictions to identify those worthy of enforcement action. President
Obama described his enforcement philosophy as “felons, not families.”242 Moreover,
his administration’s enforcement priorities focused almost exclusively on
immigrants with criminal convictions for “serious felonies.”243 Although those
“serious felonies” were often nonviolent and minor, arrests and convictions
frequently serve as markers for those worthy of removal.244 In so doing, however,
proponents of this view risk making the worst thing someone has done the only thing
that matters to the immigration system.245
This practice of legitimating immigration enforcement by vilifying one subset of
deportable immigrants and valorizing another has deep historical roots. Kelly Lytle
Hernandez argues that this shift began in the mid-1950s, as Border Patrol began
performing more crime control work, principally enforcement of the drug laws.246
This in effect “recast the problem of unsanctioned Mexican immigration as a matter
of quality not quantity,” which served to justify the Border Patrol’s “continued
concentration upon the U.S.-Mexico border and persons of Mexican origin despite
the reduction of apprehensions that continued into the early 1970s.”247 During this
era, immigration enforcement shifted from the awkward and unsympathetic task of

community reaction to deportation of long-term resident and restauranteur, who had entered
the United States without inspection twenty years before).
240. See WADHIA, BANNED, supra note 3, at 41 (noting Trump administration’s shift from
prioritizing for deportation individuals without regard to equities “such as long-term residence,
employment, and service in the military”).
241. Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New
Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 228 (2012).
242. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11
/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/7B7U-QY82].
243. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the
Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), https://www
.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc
/4873-4PGZ].
244. See Christie Thompson & Anna Flagg, Who Is ICE Deporting? Obama’s Promise to
Focus on “Felons Not Families” Has Fallen Short, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 26, 2016,
3:30 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/09/26/who-is-ice-deporting [https:/
/perma.cc/9VLS-HK52] (noting that forty percent of noncitizens deported after announcement
of priorities had no criminal conviction at all, let alone for a serious felony).
245. Cf. BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 17–18
(2014) (“Each of us is more than the worst thing we’ve ever done.”).
246. HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 114, at 195.
247. Id. at 179.
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expelling workers with families to defending against immigrant criminality, revealed
by the immigrant’s violation of the border.248
These distinctions among deportable immigrants and the search for “equities”
normalize deportation and legitimate the current system of highly limited pathways
to legal entry combined with tacit acceptance of huge populations of undocumented
residents. But short of a complete halting of immigration enforcement, immigration
enforcement will happen, and policy will influence to whom it happens.249 Although
equity-based discretion masks structural injustices, the alternative to a rationalized
system based on priorities is indiscriminate enforcement.250
2. The Complete Devolution of Discretion
Echoing the critics of DAPA, enforcement policy under the Trump
Administration rejected formal presidential supervision of enforcement discretion.
Specifically, enforcement policy established weak enforcement priorities that swept
in much of the deportable population and underscored that no one was exempt from
enforcement. President Trump’s Executive Order establishing enforcement priorities
for DHS formally focused on “criminal aliens,” but functionally rendered everyone
a priority.251 When nearly everyone is a priority, rank and file officers enjoy the
freedom to apprehend and deport any deportable noncitizen based on nothing other
than their own preferences or judgments.
To a large extent, the Trump Administration’s approach to immigration
enforcement devolved discretion down to the rank and file. Pursuant to the January
25, 2017, Executive Order, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement
Improvements, the President instructed DHS to redouble its commitment to faithfully
executing the immigration laws.252 In a February 2017 guidance memorandum from
then-DHS Secretary John Kelly, the Secretary instructed subagency heads to
“faithfully execute the immigration laws of the United States against all removable
aliens.”253 Notably, the guidance memorandum established that “the Department no
longer will exempt classes or categories of removable aliens from potential
enforcement.”254 The Secretary then articulated seven priorities, including deportable
aliens convicted of any criminal offense, those who have been charged with any
criminal offense, and those who have “committed acts which constitute a chargeable
criminal offense,” thereby sweeping in every single immigrant who entered without
inspection, as well as any unauthorized immigrant who has ever driven without a
drivers’ license in a jurisdiction that does not give them to unauthorized
immigrants.255 Rejecting Obama-era enforcement discretion priorities and

248. Id. at 207.
249. See Markowitz, supra note 24, at 130–33.
250. One other alternative is to abolish deportation altogether. See Angélica Cházaro, The
End of Deportation, 67 UCLA L. REV. (2021) (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3415707 [https://perma.cc/5GH4-D9AU].
251. WADHIA, BANNED, supra note 3, at 41.
252. Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
253. Memorandum from John Kelly, supra note 4, at 2.
254. Id.
255. Id.; see also WADHIA, BANNED, supra note 3, at 32 (noting that “a noncitizen who
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establishment of exempt classes, the memorandum essentially made every deportable
noncitizen a “priority.”256 It expressly licensed the pursuit of low-level violators.257
A lack of meaningful enforcement priorities results in indiscriminate
enforcement, for any and all violators risk arrest.258 Scholars have noted that when
high-level agency officials refuse to establish meaningful enforcement priorities or
to draw lines of seriousness or culpability among violators, this discretion frequently
devolves to line officers.259 Vesting low-level officers with discretion to make federal
immigration policy infuses immigration enforcement with randomness and the
potential for bias. The long history of enforcement officials conflating race and
illegal presence further cautions against complete devolution.260 Such a policy trades
transparency and “bounded discretion” for decentralization.261
For these reasons, such a style of enforcement falls short of faithful execution.
Not all intra-agency delegations of discretion should prompt concern, but here the
President effectively denied any qualitative distinctions among deportable
immigrants, defying well-established norms of immigration enforcement.262
Moreover, evidence suggests that the share of noncitizens without criminal
convictions among those apprehended for removal rose under the Trump
Administration, undermining claims that the agency focused on public safety and
perceived security threats.263 Given these facts and particular characteristics of
immigration law, complete decentralization reveals either a lack of reasonable care
or a lack of good faith—or both. It fails the test of good faith constitutionalism and
constitutes presidential abdication.
Drawing a line between ordinary devolution and abdication presents a challenge.
But a bright-line rule is articulable: the government can demonstrate that it engaged
in good-faith line drawing by specifying a temporarily exempt class of “low-priority”

jaywalks in a city where jaywalking is a crime but who is never charged may be classified as
a person who ‘commits an act that constitutes a chargeable offense’”).
256. See WADHIA, BANNED, supra note 3, at 30; see also AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note
2.
257. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration Enforcement and the Future of
Discretion, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 353, 358 (2018).
258. Bouie, supra note 5 (describing ICE’s style as “indiscriminate”).
259. Cf. Motomura, supra note 222, at 1838 (identifying a police officer’s decision to arrest
a noncitizen for a criminal offense as the critical site of discretion).
260. Hiroshi Motomura has characterized this devolution of discretion as “rogue by
design.” See Motomura, supra note 3, at 451. Kelly Lytle Hernández has also argued that
immigration police have long conflated Mexican ethnicity with illegal presence. HERNÁNDEZ,
supra note 107, at 42.
261. Bernick, supra note 20, at 42.
262. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 46 (2011).
263. Philip Bump, Migrants Targeted Under Trump Are Less Likely To Have Criminal
Records, WASH. POST (July 19, 2019, 5:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/2019/07/19/migrants-targeted-by-ice-under-trump-are-much-less-likely-have-criminalrecords/ [https://perma.cc/78XY-4MGF]; see also Spagat, supra note 5 (discussing thendeputy director of ICE Thomas Homan’s statement denying “indiscriminate” enforcement but
revealing that more immigrants without criminal histories were being apprehended by
immigration enforcement under Trump than under Obama).
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noncitizens. In this way, the agency would publicly commit to focusing on other
noncitizens.
3. Zero Tolerance
A similar, but distinct, style of enforcement in recent years transcends
“enforcement without priorities.”264 Unpublished guidance during the Trump
administration appears to have required line officers to take enforcement action
against all deportable noncitizens encountered. As a result, line officers appeared to
lack the discretion to weigh equities or prioritize arrests. Stripping the rank and file
of the choice to show lenience, such a policy aims to satisfy those seeking “full
enforcement” of the immigration laws; but such a policy does not amount to faithful
execution.
In 2017, ERO’s director established zero tolerance for unauthorized immigrants
by memorandum. The memorandum starts with the proposition that no classes of
deportable aliens are exempt, but it then proceeds to tie line officers’ hands once they
encounter such an individual. Specifically, the memorandum prohibits line officers
from exercising discretion to show lenience on a case-by-case basis. Instead, the
memorandum states:
Effective immediately, ERO officers will take enforcement action
against all removable aliens encountered in the course of their duties. As
always, ERO officers must make an individualized custody
determination in every case, prioritizing detention resources on aliens
subject to expedited removal and aliens removable on any criminal
ground, security or related ground, or for grounds related to fraud or
material misrepresentation. Under the terms of the E.O., DHS will no
longer exempt classes or categories of removable aliens from potential
enforcement. 265
According to these terms, line officers “will” arrest all deportable immigrants
“encountered.” Unlike a regime that devolves discretion to line officers to consult
priorities and weigh equities, it imposes a “shall” instead of a “may.” Although
officers’ individualized judgments apply to custody determinations, they have no
bearing on arrests.266 Thus, ERO started from the President’s and Secretary’s view
that no one is exempt, but it then imposed a form of zero tolerance, ignoring whatever
guidance the rudderless priorities provided in the first place.267 Unlike blanket
enforcement, which devolves discretion completely to line officers, zero tolerance

264. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 2.
265. Memorandum from Matthew T. Albence, supra note 9, at 1.
266. David J. Bier, Unpublished ICE Memo Allows Arrests of Non-Criminal Immigrants
Who Trump Did Not Prioritize, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (July 7, 2017, 10:02 AM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/unpublished-memo-allows-arrests-non-criminal-immigrants-whotrump-did-not-prioritize [https://perma.cc/7VJY-LVWX].
267. Marcelo Rochabrun, ICE Officers Told to Take Action Against All Undocumented
Immigrants Encountered While on Duty, PROPUBLICA (July 7, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www
.propublica.org/article/ice-officers-told-to-take-action-against-all-undocumented-immigrants
-encountered-while-on-duty [https://perma.cc/VB6Y-H4BN].
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superficially centralizes discretion at the top. Functionally, however, as explained
below, zero tolerance simply pushes discretion back to the stage of surveillance and
investigation.
Lest one dismiss this approach as a single errant memorandum, OPLA similarly
discouraged entertaining requests for prosecutorial discretion under the Trump
administration. Specifically, it encouraged ICE attorneys to ignore requests for
relief.268 It further instructed ICE attorneys to reopen administratively closed
cases.269 Thus, internal guidance from ERO and OPLA leadership instructed line
officers to arrest all deportable noncitizens they encounter and discouraged the use
of discretion to weigh equities in an individual case.270 Because the Trump
administration prized increasing the numbers of removals over all else, enforcement
officials increasingly focused on obtaining removals in whatever way possible.
Under the ERO zero-tolerance policy, immigration officers enforce according to
whom they can locate with the greatest ease. These immigrants are the “lowest
hanging fruit” that walk into a DHS subagency’s office271 but also include
immigrants locatable through pervasive surveillance and dataveillance technologies
about which the public knows very little. The lack of transparency, consistency, and
accountability that characterizes this displaced discretion raises serious questions for
faithful execution.
a. Punishing Compliant Conduct
Zero tolerance violates faithful execution by enabling irrational policy and
allowing the President and high-level agency officials to ignore hard choices about
how to allocate resources. Instead, they seek to fulfill their duties by apprehending
so-called low-hanging fruit. Consider deportable immigrants who walk into an ICE
office for what they believe is a routine check-in, only to be arrested and detained
pending removal.272 Consider also ICE’s coordination with U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) to determine when and where a deportable immigrant
will arrive for an interview at a USCIS office for a potential immigration benefit,

268. Hamed Aleaziz, An ICE Memo Lays Out the Differences Between Trump and Obama
on Immigration Enforcement, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 8, 2018, 3:09 PM), https://www
.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/trump-ice-attorneys-foia-memo-discretion [https:/
/perma.cc/6JC5-4ZWC] (describing how OPLA memorandum instructed ICE attorneys that
they had no obligation to check the inbox where immigrants’ attorneys ask for relief).
269. Memorandum from Tracy Short, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigrs. and Customs
Enf’t, Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding the Implementation of the President's
Executive Orders and the Secretary's Directives on Immigration Enforcement (Aug. 15, 2017),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4996339/18100807.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MP8
-Q5XQ]; Aleaziz, supra note 268.
270. Memorandum from Tracy Short, supra note 269, at 4 (“No individual classes or
categories of removable aliens are excluded from enforcement.”).
271. Flores, supra note 7 (noting that ICE has increased apprehensions of removable
noncitizens at routine ICE check-ins).
272. Michael Paluska, Dad Described as 'Perfect’ Green Card Candidate Detained by ICE
During Routine Immigration Check-In, ABC ACTION NEWS (Oct. 1, 2019, 8:35 PM), https:/
/www.abcactionnews.com/news/region-hillsborough/ice-officials-detain-tampa-dad-of-sixamerican-children-during-routine-immigration-check-in [https://perma.cc/X5PY-G6AC].
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only to ensure that an ICE agent is also present to apprehend the immigrant.273 This
approach seeks to maximize the number of deportations without regard to the
circumstances of individual noncitizens and, in many cases, their citizen family
members. These tactics further smack of “bait and switch,” where the government
agency arranges an appointment to meet a deportable immigrant for a non-removal
purpose, only to take custody of the immigrant for removal proceedings. Such tactics
could also constitute entrapment, triggering due process concerns, depending on the
circumstances.274
Fundamentally, zero tolerance runs afoul of the most basic requirement of law:
rationality. In Judulang v. Holder, the Supreme Court held that the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) had violated the Administrative Procedure Act by
adopting an irrational approach to granting relief from removal under INA §
212(c).275 Congress had repealed § 212(c) in 1996, but the Supreme Court
subsequently held that it remained available for noncitizens who may have entered
guilty pleas (prior to § 212(c)’s repeal) in reliance on its availability.276 The BIA
subsequently developed a policy that made § 212(c) relief available to individuals
facing deportation only if their offense had a “comparable ground” in the INA’s
exclusion provisions.277 Because the availability of relief hinged on “the meaningless
matching of statutory grounds,” the Court held that the BIA’s policy limited §
212(c)’s scope in an irrational way.278 The Court chided the BIA for choosing a
method for disbursing relief without regard to the noncitizen’s “fitness to remain in
the country.”279 All of this suggests that rationality functions as a substantive
constraint on enforcement decisions.280
If, like the Supreme Court, one recognizes qualitative differences among
deportable immigrants despite their common transgression of immigration law, these
deportations almost necessarily sacrifice quality for cost. The government pursues
those whom it can apprehend most cheaply, including immigrants who walk in. And
yet, immigrants who comply with the government’s terms for avoiding deportation
and those who have significant family ties to U.S. citizens that enable them to apply
for immigration benefits possess the very characteristics and equities that would
normally lead ICE to forbear. Instead, ICE justifies the removals by noting that no
one is exempt.281 Easily apprehended individuals are the prime targets of zero

273. Brenda Medina, Man Goes to Immigration Interview, Gets Detained by ICE, AP (Oct.
13, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/4bb97fdbc9194f1981e1523872fb60a9 [https://perma.cc
/QYU3-SHQ6].
274. Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 68 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 1002
(2017) (discussing due process considerations for people who revealed information in reliance
on nonenforcement under DACA).
275. 565 U.S. 42, 46 (2011).
276. Id. at 48.
277. Id. at 49.
278. Id. at 57.
279. Id. at 55
280. Id. at 58 (critiquing regime in which a noncitizen’s right to remain in the country
“hangs on the fortuity of an individual official’s decision”).
281. Medina, supra note 273.

2021]

ABDICATION THROUGH ENFORCEMENT

1363

tolerance.282 For administrations fixated on perceived immigrant criminality, it
behooves agency leaders to justify tactics that ensnare so many noncitizens without
any criminal history.
b. Following a Hidden Data Trail
A similar sacrifice of quality for cost occurs when enforcement agents use data
analytics to guide investigations. The government collects, or contracts with private
companies to collect, unprecedented amounts of information about every person in
the country.283 Coupled with widespread information-sharing agreements with other
federal and subfederal government actors, ICE possesses staggering surveillance
capabilities.284 Finding success in leveraging “big data” to locate deportable
noncitizens, ICE seeks new data with a tenacity comparable to a “hunt.”285 This
approach to enforcement implicates faithful execution because it occurs in the dark
corners of law enforcement. When enforcement officials deny qualitative differences
among deportable noncitizens but not all can be deported, these unmonitored
technologies set de facto priorities outside the ambit of presidential supervision.
Technology increasingly sweeps up information about every person in the United
States, and deportable immigrants engage in a range of activities that potentially
leave a data trail revealing their immigration status.286 They pay taxes and buy
homes, but they also pursue higher education, seek medical treatment for
communicable diseases, and call 911 to report crime. Using revelations of identity

282. Nick Miroff & Maria Sacchetti, Trump Takes Shackles off ICE, Which is Slapping
Them on Immigrants Who Thought They Were Safe, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2018, 7:10 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-takes-shackles-off-icewhich-is-slapping-them-on-immigrants-who-thought-they-were-safe/2018/02/11/4bd5c164083a-11e8-b48c-b07fea957bd5_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4d0a7424578e
[https://perma.cc/TB6D-EJAR].
283. Spencer Woodman, Palantir Provides the Engine for Donald Trump’s Deportation
Machine, INTERCEPT (March 2, 2017, 1:18 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/03/02/palantirprovides-the-engine-for-donald-trumps-deportation-machine/
[https://perma.cc/Z77AMCGE] (describing ICE’s deployment of Investigative Case Management (ICM), a platform
developed by the data-mining company Palantir). Cf. Joel Rose, Can Big Data Really Help
Screen Immigrants? NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Dec. 15, 2017, 4:23 PM), https://www
.npr.org/2017/12/15/571199955/dhs-wants-to-build-a-computer-system-to-help-determinewho-gets-to-visit-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/FEV7-YUNA].
284. See Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1 (2014); Kathleen J.
Frydl, The Incidental State: Coercion in the Age of Big Data, DISSENT MAG. (May 2, 2014),
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/the-incidental-state-coercion-in-the-age-of-big-data
[https://perma.cc/3FSH-E6ZM] (arguing that “[e]nhanced data collection,” itself innocuous,
can lead law enforcement to automate what was previously a “sequence of discretionary
decisions,” thereby “lower[ing] the bar for the application of force”).
285. See WTVF Staff, Nashville Elementary School Refuses to Provide ICE with Student
Records, ABC 15 (Oct. 11, 2019, 5:50 AM), https://www.abc15.com/news/national/nashvilleelementary-school-refuses-to-provide-ice-with-student-records
[https://perma.cc/DS46AJ85].
286. See Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior
Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1143 (2008).
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from these activities to locate deportable noncitizens seriously impacts both
noncitizens and citizens, and yet without statutory, regulatory, or internal guidance
on the use and aggregation of such data, agents remain unconstrained in their use of
them. A few vignettes illustrate the point. In February 2018, Rodriguez Maccareno
called 911 to report a burglary of his home, and the local police responded. Because
local police store ICE warrants in the same database as criminal complaints, ICE also
responded, arresting Maccareno and placing him in removal proceedings.287 Around
the same time, Blanca Morales, a DACA recipient, was admitted to Harvard Medical
School, but she feared that her federal student loan application would “out” her
parents as undocumented, leading to their removal and destroying her family.288
Some advocates also fear that, despite statutory protection of tax information, DHS
will at some point access sensitive information from the Internal Revenue Service
and Social Security Administration to target immigrant workers who pay taxes under
someone else’s Social Security number.289 Leading immigrants’ rights organizations
have counseled hospitals to be cognizant of the sensitive information contained in
records they share with ICE and the potential immigration consequences of such
revelations.290
As these vignettes illustrate, ICE can acquire immigrant identity information from
innocuous, socially responsible, or even at times “prosocial”291 behaviors, and this
undermines public policy. By using identity information collected and transmitted
from socially useful behaviors, such as criminal complaints, applications for
adjustment of status, or medical treatment, ICE deters noncitizens from engaging in

287. Rex Santus, Cops Turned an Immigrant Over to ICE After He Called 911, VICE (Feb.
14, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/kzp73y/cops-turned-an-immigrantover-to-ice-after-he-called-911 [https://perma.cc/48ZJ-27MN].
288. Rosa Flores & Kevin Conlon, Success for Harvard Medical Students in DACA Could
Mean Their Parents Are Deported, CNN (Feb. 13, 2018, 12:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com
/2018/02/13/politics/daca-harvard-medical-students/index.html
[https://perma.cc/QBW64KWB]. This would occur when a student with undocumented parents fills in all zeroes for
her parents’ Social Security numbers on loan application documents or even the FAFSA (Free
Application for Federal Student Aid).
289. Jennifer Chang Newell, Is the IRS Sharing Tax Information to Deport Immigrants?,
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 24, 2018, 4:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/immigrants-tax-taxesdeport-immigration-899721 [https://perma.cc/84H2-2ZD2].
290. Healthcare Providers and Immigration Enforcement: Know Your Rights, Know Your
Patients’ Rights, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Apr. 2017), https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration
-enforcement/healthcare-provider-and-patients-rights-imm-enf/
[https://perma.cc/C9R6W4A8].
291. An example of governments rewarding prosocial behavior is the case of Mamoudou
Gassama, a French migrant from Mali, who was granted French citizenship after scaling four
balconies to save a dangling toddler. See Aurelien Breeden & Alan Cowell, Paris ‘SpiderMan’ Saves Young Boy. Cue Debate on Migrants., N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2018), https://www
.nytimes.com/2018/05/28/world/europe/paris-migrant-hero-spiderman.html [https://perma.cc
/9SZ9-SB4K]; see also Adry Torres, Deported Father Begs U.S. for Humanitarian Visa to
Attend Miami Funeral of Teenage Son Who Died Rescuing a Mother and Child From
Drowning, DAILYMAIL (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7538219
/Deported-dad-hopes-U-S-allow-enter-country-attend-funeral-Miami-hero-teen-son.html
[https://perma.cc/5L6J-Z4PK].
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them.292 This, in turn, eliminates positive spillovers and sometimes produces
negative spillovers. In the former case, society stands to lose over the long run when
young people decline professional training, and in the latter, sick persons avoiding
treatment directly undermines public health and community well-being. Reliance on
hidden data trails or data-driven investigative methods further impedes efforts on the
part of state and local governments to integrate immigrants. For example, many
“sanctuary” jurisdictions have involuntarily (and for a long time, unknowingly)
populated ICE’s databases because of compulsory participation in a national criminal
law database that ICE routinely accesses.293 Localities’ forced disclosure of data for
immigration enforcement undermines their efforts to integrate and include residents
regardless of immigration status.
De facto prioritizing immigrants for deportation when they reveal their
immigration status in these ways frustrates reliance interests294 and ultimately fails
to take seriously the distinctions among deportable immigrants.295 As Eisha Jain has
argued, the hidden costs of harsh, unpredictable exercises of immigration
enforcement discretion abounds.296 Fear of employers calling ICE drives immigrant
workers not to report safety violations, wage theft, and other harmful workplace
practices.297 Those who do are swiftly deported.298 Moreover, the full costs also
include those associated with immigrant “passing.”299 Angela S. García has argued
that harsh enforcement climates do not always lead undocumented immigrants to
retreat to the shadows of the community. Sometimes, they will instead strive to
“pass” as a U.S.-born or other legally present person. Passing means investing in a
persona, “a strategic presentation of self to the outside world that takes on
characteristics associated with mainstream, U.S.-born groups to mask unauthorized
immigration status.”300 These efforts constitute potential costs in addition to the
many that DHS currently ignores without justification.

292. For example, economists have argued that Hispanic citizens under-use public benefits
out of fear of deportation of their noncitizen contacts. Marcella Alsan & Crystal Yang, Fear
and the Safety Net: Evidence from Secure Communities (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 24,731, July 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24731 [https://perma
.cc/949H-WTE4].
293. Ali Winston, How Sanctuary Cities Can Protect Undocumented Immigrants from ICE
Data Mining, INTERCEPT (June 16, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/06/16/how-sanctuarycities-can-protect-undocumented-immigrants-from-ice-data-mining/ [https://perma.cc/9V2ATYKU].
294. See Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs?: Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea of
Americans in Waiting, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359 (2012) (discussing contract view of
immigration and the notion that immigrants who invest in building lives in the U.S. develop
reliance interests in remaining here undisturbed).
295. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 24 (rev. ed. 1999) (noting that utilitarianism
fails to “take seriously the distinction between persons”).
296. See Jain, supra note 5, at 1490.
297. See Lauren Zanolli, Worker Who Raised Alarm Before Deadly New Orleans Hotel
Collapse to Be Deported, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news
/2019/nov/22/new-orleans-hotel-collapse-deported-honduras [https://perma.cc/QD64-7K5H].
298. See id.
299. See ANGELA S. GARCÍA, LEGAL PASSING 134 (2019).
300. Id. Stella Burch Elias has similarly analyzed passing and related phenomena. See
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The use of big data technologies in immigration enforcement erodes social utility
and has implications for discretion when a government adopts a zero-tolerance
policy. As previously discussed, under zero tolerance, enforcement depends entirely
on whom officers find, which in turn depends on where and how they look. Big data
brings many more immigrants and citizens onto ICE’s radar. As Elizabeth E. Joh has
argued in the criminal legal setting, “surveillance discretion” has expanded through
the use of big data.301 Surveillance discretion refers to “the decisions that
[enforcement officials] make about individuals before any search, detention, or arrest
takes place.”302 Just like police officers seeking crime suspects, immigration line
officers possess discretion regarding whom to identify and investigate for suspected
immigration violations.
Big data transforms investigations; rather than starting with a suspect and then
investigating that person, big data can reveal suspects who “emerge from the data.”303
The technology driving immigration enforcement hails from Silicon Valley, and
newer tools complement existing capabilities to leverage national databases, along
with the potential to match them against local information. This includes DMV rolls,
which many jurisdictions collect without realizing they ultimately merge into a
database accessible by federal immigration officials.304 Under zero tolerance, every
target encountered will be deported, and enforcement officials using big data let the
data suggest potential targets. In this way, the data itself sets the priorities, and
discretion migrates to a point prior to the line officer’s encounter—to programmatic
choices regarding investigative methods, surveillance, and dataveillance, through
which a line officer locates a deportable noncitizen in the first place.305
The migration of discretion to hidden corners undermines important rule of law
values. First, such a regime allows agency officials to pretend they are engaged in
full enforcement, resource constraints notwithstanding. They simply repeat the
refrain that no one is exempt from enforcement and decline to draw lines among
deportable noncitizens. They do not explain that the noncitizens who are deported
will essentially be selected according to the ease of finding them. Second, the lack
of transparency about surveillance and dataveillance practices impedes political
accountability for choices to collect and use certain data about immigrants.306 Third,

Stella Burch Elias, Immigrant Covering, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 765 (2017). She argues that
immigration law has not only stimulated passing, but it has facilitated “covering” as well.
“Covering” refers to integrative efforts to reduce disparities in access to benefits and services
on account of undocumented status. The harm of passing and covering rests largely with the
ultimately unresolved state of an undocumented immigrant’s legal status; passing and covering
are necessarily stop-gap or ameliorative rather than curative. They embody precarity.
301. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big
Data, and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 19 (2016).
302. Id. at 18.
303. Id. at 21.
304. See April Glaser, Sanctuary Cities are Handing ICE a Map, SLATE (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/03/how-ice-may-be-able-to-access-license-plate-datafrom-sanctuary-cities-and-use-it-for-arrests.html [https://perma.cc/T74F-AYPV].
305. Joh argues for locating discretion in criminal policing “at an earlier stage: when the
police focus on persons suspected of ongoing or future criminal activity but before any
intervention takes place.” Joh, supra note 301, at 18.
306. See McKenzie Funk, How ICE Picks Its Targets in the Surveillance Age, N.Y. TIMES
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the migration of discretion creates an environment ripe for acting on the bias baked
into investigative tools.307 When an immigration enforcement policy depends
entirely on systems of big-data surveillance that scholars have for years described as
inadequately regulated and poorly understood, the executive cannot be said to be
adequately guiding line officers’ exercise of enforcement discretion.
Ultimately, increased surveillance discretion imposes a quality-cost trade-off,
also characterized as a quality-quantity trade-off. When government officials
irrationally deem all removals qualitatively equal (and equally bad), they have the
incentive to pursue cheap removals, i.e., the ones that take the least time, effort, or
resources. Necessarily, these will ensnare people who bring themselves to the
attention of the government, often, although not exclusively, through innocuous
conduct, or through the data trail they leave behind. These decisions occur hidden
from higher-level agency officials, thus shielding this vast discretion completely
from executive supervision. All of this suggests that zero tolerance makes for bad
policy. But this Article argues further that it violates the duty of faithful execution
because it flows from an irrational premise, one that the Supreme Court has
disavowed in a related setting.308
4. Objections
Numerous likely objections arise. With respect to complete devolution, some
might contend that empowering line officers allows agencies to capture the expertise
and creativity that low-level bureaucrats principally possess.309 Low-level
bureaucrats have a fuller factual picture based on their work on the front lines of
enforcement. They see countless individual cases and can make better-informed
decisions than high-level agency personnel. But some degree of line officer
discretion is inherent in all enforcement, and the question is whether an extreme or
total devolution comports with the constitutional requirement of constrained
delegation and presidential supervision. Even defenders of empowering line officers

(Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/magazine/ice-surveillance-deportation
.html [https://perma.cc/SEZ8-FAZ8]; cf. Emily Berman, Regulating Domestic Intelligence
Collection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2014); Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as
Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1054 (2016).
307. A large literature on algorithmic bias establishes that automated, mechanized
processes remain susceptible to racial bias. See generally Anupam Chander, The Racist
Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023 (2017) (reviewing Frank Pasquale’s book, The Black Box
Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information). In recognition of this
problem, lawmakers have introduced legislation to require companies to monitor bias and
inaccuracies in their algorithms. See Jack Corrigan, Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Curb
Algorithmic Bias, NEXTGOV (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech
/2019/04/lawmakers-introduce-bill-curb-algorithmic-bias/156237/ [https://perma.cc/7KMQ9GDH] (describing the Algorithmic Accountability Act). This bill did not progress out of
committee, but it could be reintroduced. See Grace Dille, Sen. Wyden to Reintroduce AI Bias
Bill in Coming Months, MERITALK (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.meritalk.com/articles/senwyden-to-reintroduce-ai-bias-bill-in-coming-months/ [https://perma.cc/W3GY-D5KK].
308. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 55 (2011).
309. See Landau, supra note 154, at 1185 (discussing expertise of low-level bureaucrats
who have been exercising executive discretion “for decades”).
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acknowledge the need for “supervision by policy officials who have the bigger
picture in mind.”310
Although lower-level bureaucrats often possess valuable expertise and knowledge
of local conditions that would favor devolution in many settings, those reasons do
not apply with equal force in immigration law. First, the culture of immigration
enforcement agencies has taken a draconian turn, with ICE and CBP resisting
lenience and pressing for full enforcement. Many agencies have a clear constituency
and base their policy decisions on scientific, economic, or other technical expertise.
In the VA Hospitals, for example, one might argue that physicians (the equivalent of
“low-level bureaucrats” in the agency) are best situated to diagnose and treat patients.
Presidential supervision in the form of, say, requiring use of a specific medicine,
could prove disastrous.
But the enforcement units of DHS do not serve a clear constituency, and when all
deportable noncitizens are considered qualitatively equal, their work does not require
special credentialing or technical knowledge.311 ICE perhaps serves all U.S. citizens
or all lawfully present individuals, and its mission appeals to the vague concepts of
public safety and economic welfare. In such a setting, without institutional
safeguards, the agency’s culture assumes central importance in shaping line officers’
behavior, and the prevailing culture in immigration enforcement has been
characterized at best as “rogue,” and at worst, as channeling immigration
enforcement’s abusive foundations.312 There is a second reason to doubt the wisdom
of complete devolution in immigration enforcement. Unlike in other agencies, where
line officers have a variety of tools for sanctioning offenders, such as administrative,
civil, or criminal penalties, the INA contemplates one principal penalty for nearly all
immigration offenses: deportation.313 Because not every deportable noncitizen can
or will be deported, this creates a system of informal sanctions in which immigration
officers distribute discretionary reprieves.314 With a lack of statutory or other
guidance applicable to these sanctions in many instances, bureaucrats perform their
most important work shielded from public scrutiny. The lack of transparency and
formal opportunities for calibration on the backend underscore the need for robust
enforcement priorities at the frontend.
With respect to zero tolerance, the government has suggested that anything less
gives some rule violators a pass.315 Defenders of zero tolerance, like former Attorney

310. Id. at 1197.
311. Some aspects of DHS’s work, such as consular processing, do require expertise. See
James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1, 53–
54 (1991) (discussing expertise of consular officers adjudicating visa applications). Weighing
equities is a nuanced endeavor, but a policy that disavows any qualitative distinctions among
deportable immigrants does not call upon line officers to make these nuanced judgments.
312. Adam Isacson, Commentary, Fixing a Culture that Protects and Rewards Abuses at
U.S. Border Agencies, WASH. OFF. ON LATIN AM. (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.wola.org
/analysis/fixing-a-culture-protects-rewards-abuse-us-border-agencies/
[https://perma.cc
/K44D-SU4M].
313. Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1691 (2009).
314. See HARRINGTON, supra note 104.
315. See Anil Kalhan, DAPA, ‘Lawful Presence,’ and the Illusion of a Problem, YALE J.
ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/dapa-lawful-
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General Jeff Sessions, suggest that showing lenience or drawing lines imbues virtue
and merit in lawbreaking.316 Moreover, the argument goes, by insulating some
unauthorized entrants from enforcement, the government fails to send a clear
message about the unacceptability of illegal immigration.317 On this view, every
illegal entry violates sovereignty.
National sovereignty in a constitutional democracy, or the right to collective selfdetermination, means that members of the nation choose the rules by which the
nation operates.318 Members also adopt rules of membership. Unauthorized migrants,
by entering without inspection, essentially disregard the rules of membership that a
nation has adopted.319 Circumstances such as a long history of U.S. intervention in a
region might justify such disregard,320 but for strict defenders of sovereignty, all
border transgressions and violations of the rules for remaining in the country should
necessarily trigger banishment.
This argument suffers from several flaws.321 First, it conflates all immigration
violations as “sovereignty” violations. Some migrants are unauthorized because they
entered lawfully but have overstayed their visas, some are lawful permanent residents
who have committed deportable offenses, and some are migrants that entered without
authorization, either with fraudulent documents or without inspection.322 The
“sovereignty” violation appears strongest with the migrants who entered without

presence-and-the-illusion-of-a-problem-by-anil-kalhan/
[https://perma.cc/K44D-SU4M]
(discussing Judge Hanen’s view to this effect).
316. See Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Remarks Discussing the Immigration
Enforcement Actions of the Trump Administration (May 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov
/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-discussing-immigration-enforcement
-actions [https://perma.cc/4HFP-3RNP] (“Citizens of other countries don’t get to violate our
laws or rewrite them for us. People around the world have no right to demand entry in violation
of our sovereignty.”).
317. See Brief for the Petitioner at 31, DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 140 S. Ct.
1891 (2020) (Nos. 18-587, 18-588, 18-589), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18
/18-587/112855/20190819213105900_18-587tsUnitedStates.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GA32C6BQ].
318. See generally SARAH SONG, IMMIGRATION AND DEMOCRACY 54 (2019) (describing the
internal dimension of collective self-determination as “the idea of popular sovereignty—that
the people are the ultimate source of political authority”).
319. Cf. Christopher Heath Wellman, Immigration and the Freedom of Association, 119
ETHICS 109, 114 (2008) (discussing the importance of rules of membership).
320. See Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Reparations for Central American Refugees, 96 DENV. L.
REV. 585, 592–93 (2019) (presenting a historical overview of violence in Central America in
the 1980s and 1990s); id. at 598–99 (discussing the role of the United States in creating peril);
E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1521 (2019)
(identifying “Third World migration to the First World as an entitlement of neocolonial
imperial membership on grounds of political equality”).
321. For a fundamental critique of “sovereignty discourse,” see Achiume, supra note 320,
at 1521.
322. Robert Warren, US Undocumented Population Continued to Fall from 2016 to 2017,
and Visa Overstays Significantly Exceeded Illegal Crossings for the Seventh Consecutive
Year, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUDS. (Jan. 16, 2019), https://cmsny.org/publications/essay-2017
-undocumented-and-overstays/ [https://perma.cc/U6YH-985C].
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inspection or by fraud;323 the others followed the rules of entry. Unsurprisingly,
scholars have discerned qualitative differences among these violations.324 Second,
even with respect to these “sovereignty” violations, immigrants themselves differ
qualitatively in important ways, and some may assert competing rights. For example,
consistent with the United States Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Congress preserves unauthorized entrants’ right to seek asylum,325 perhaps because
U.S. law provides few avenues for asylum seekers’ lawful entry in the first place.326
Under prior administrations, the government recognized that asylum seekers
frequently possess some form of irregular status.327 Thus, a migrant’s “illegal entry”
might be justified if she subsequently lodges a nonfrivolous asylum claim. An
individual noncitizen’s particular circumstances shape the quality (and forgivability)
of the transgression, or whether it is properly deemed a transgression at all. A zerotolerance policy, however, ignores these meaningful distinctions, defying rationality.
It transforms law execution into a robotic enterprise based on opaque investigatory
processes. It might qualify as execution, but not as faithful execution.328

323. Even here, however, the INA provides for waivers that would ultimately shield some
unlawful entrants from deportation under INA § 237(a)(1). See, e.g., INA §§ 212(d), (i)
(describing waivers). Accordingly, not every unlawful entry ultimately leads to banishment.
324. See Stumpf, supra note 24, at 1685.
325. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (providing for right to seek asylum for unauthorized entrants). In
2018, the Trump Administration adopted a new rule barring asylum claims from individuals
who cross between ports of entry. Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential
Proclamations; Procedures for Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934 (Nov. 9, 2018) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003, 1208). Plaintiffs challenged the rule, and a preliminary injunction
prevented it from going into effect. However, the Trump Administration then instituted a
transit ban, barring anyone from applying for asylum if they transited through a third country
before reaching the United States. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed.
Reg. 33,829 (July 16, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003, 1208). Although the trial
court issued a preliminary injunction and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court
allowed this ban to take effect. See Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. 3 (2019).
President Biden subsequently directed DHS to review the transit ban, among other policies
relating to asylum. See Exec. Order 14010, 86 Fed. Reg. 8267, Creating a Comprehensive
Regional Framework to Address the Causes of Migration, to Manage Migration Throughout
North and Central America, and to Provide Safe and Orderly Processing of Asylum Seekers
at the United States Border, (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/presidential-actions/2021/02/02/executive-order-creating-a-comprehensive-regionalframework-to-address-the-causes-of-migration-to-manage-migration-throughout-north-andcentral-america-and-to-provide-safe-and-orderly-processing/
[https://perma.cc/V2HGLQ7J].
326. Shalini Bhargava Ray, Optimal Asylum, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1215, 1230
(2013) (observing that U.S. immigration law does not offer a visa to asylum seekers to travel
to the United States to lodge their applications, and accordingly, the asylum system relies
heavily on irregular migration).
327. See Deborah E. Anker, Discretionary Asylum: A Protection Remedy for Refugees
Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 28 (1987) (noting that a UNHCR report
emphasized that “being an asylum seeker and entering ‘irregularly’ are inextricably linked”).
328. Criticisms of “zero tolerance” in criminal policing make similar points, namely that
police officers arrest those whom they encounter, and whom they encounter follows from
discretionary judgments about where to focus policing attention. See, e.g., K. Babe Howell,
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The shadow, unsupervised, and de facto enforcement policies discussed above not
only violate basic assumptions about qualitative differences among deportable
noncitizens but also defy structural constraints on executive power. Specifically,
blanket enforcement inappropriately delegates unconstrained discretion to the rank
and file, and zero tolerance merely shifts enforcement discretion to the hidden realm
of surveillance. Such a shift renders enforcement decisions even more opaque and
less accountable. As measured against the demands of faithful execution and as
argued above, these approaches fail.
III. RE-IMAGINING FAITHFUL EXECUTION IN IMMIGRATION LAW
This Article has thus far argued that “faithful execution” of the immigration laws
precludes the President from devolving unconstrained discretion to line officers to
set de facto priorities and decide how to shape and implement federal enforcement
efforts. It has further argued that faithful execution precludes adoption of zero
tolerance, which shunts discretion to the opaque realm of surveillance. But what does
it require? This Part begins sketching a future for faithful execution in immigration
law, tending both to procedural and substantive faithfulness. It concludes that, short
of congressional specification of enforcement priorities, faithful execution requires
the President or high-level agency officials to set robust enforcement priorities, as
well as measures to induce compliance by the rank and file. This conclusion follows
from a concept of faithful execution rooted in rule of law values, rationality, and
good faith constitutionalism, discussed above.
A. Procedural Faithfulness
Faithful execution in immigration law at a minimum requires setting robust
enforcement priorities to guide subordinates in ICE, CBP, and USCIS. Robust
enforcement priorities centralize discretion rather than eliminate it.329 Enforcement
priorities have had at best a mixed record in shaping line officers’ actual exercise of
enforcement discretion, but regardless of their success in inducing compliance, the
President or the DHS Secretary has a duty to articulate priorities and values
transparently.330 Under the Take Care Clause, the President has room to make policy
judgments and to organize enforcement efforts accordingly.331 He satisfies his Take
Care duty when he “uses enforcement discretion and prioritization—including

The Costs of “Broken Windows” Policing: Twenty Years and Counting, 37 CARDOZO L. REV.
1059, 1068 (2016).
329. See Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 25, at 182 (“[C]onstraining low-level
decision makers with rules simply relocates discretion to a point higher up in the
bureaucracy.”).
330. Although Congress has not articulated a duty to set enforcement priorities, under 6
U.S.C. § 202, it has assigned the responsibility of articulating them to the DHS Secretary,
appointed by the President.
331. Andrias, supra note 16, at 1039.
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nonenforcement—to advance policy goals, but only if he can articulate a reasonable
statutory basis to the public and to Congress for his decisions.”332 Under a concept
of faithful execution rooted in rationality, rule of law values, and good faith
constitutionalism rather than robotic law execution, categorical, prospective
nonenforcement policies do not necessarily abrogate his Take Care duty.333 Rather,
they force the President’s judgment into the public sphere, placing accountability for
his priorities on his shoulders.
Supreme Court precedent supports a focus on procedural faithfulness. The
removal power cases support the President’s ability to hold low-level bureaucrats
responsible for faithfully executing the laws.334 Although blanket enforcement and
zero tolerance do not implicate the President’s removal power directly, they do
implicate the very purpose for which the current Supreme Court has so passionately
protected the President’s removal power: to avoid delegating ultimate responsibility
for the actions of the executive branch. Guidance that structures enforcement
discretion to invite line officer bias or operate according to a hidden logic lacks
procedural faithfulness.
Even if the Supreme Court ultimately rejects more rule-like instantiations of
supervised enforcement discretion,335 the President’s obligation to supervise will
nonetheless remain. It might manifest instead in initiatives such as training the rank
and file, improving culture and morale by reducing chaos, and training officers on
constitutional issues that arise in enforcement.336
B. Substantive Faithfulness
Substantively, good faith requires that the President’s enforcement priorities
reflect some defensible view of the qualitative differences among deportable
immigrants. For example, as other scholars have noted, priorities based on race or
other protected characteristics would likely violate rights-based constraints on
enforcement discretion.337 The Supreme Court has ruled that prosecutions based on

332. Id. Andrias has argued further that the President merits some form of Chevron
deference “or space in enforcing the law.” Id.
333. See Bernick, supra note 20, at 60–61 (determining that DAPA was justified under the
faithful execution framework put forth based on its promotion of “accountability, bounded
discretion, the rule of law, or non-opportunism” or the “spirit of the Take Care Clause”).
334. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (invalidating as unconstitutional part of a law
that restricted the President’s power to remove first-class postmasters); Humphrey’s Ex’r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (noting that congressional authority to create quasilegislative or quasi-judicial agencies independent of executive control implies limits on the
President’s removal power).
335. The Supreme Court declined to address the legality of DACA recently. See DHS v.
Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1910 (2020).
336. Cf. Yuri R. Linetsky, What the Police Don’t Know May Hurt Us: An Argument for
Enhanced Legal Training of Police Officers, 48 N.M. L. REV. 1, 3, 41–42 (2018) (arguing for
enhanced legal training for police officers, especially with regard to constitutional safeguards).
337. Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 25, at 212 n.303 (discussing the Constitution’s
prohibition on using some criteria in enforcement, such as race).
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arbitrary classifications exceed the scope of prosecutorial discretion,338 even when it
comes to enforcement against immigrants.339
Rationality also serves as a substantive constraint. If the government decided to
deport only lawful permanent residents who had committed nonviolent deportable
offenses but not unlawful entrants with serious criminal histories, the public would,
at a minimum, deserve an explanation.340 What’s more, the Supreme Court has
rejected deportation “as a sport of chance”341 for its violation of “reasoned decisionmaking” and its disconnection from the “rational operation of the immigration
laws.”342 The Court has instead endorsed a robust conception of rationality in
evaluating deportable immigrants, one that is “tied, even if loosely, to the purposes
of the immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration system.”343
In particular, the choice to deport immigrants must be informed by some conception
of the immigrant’s “fitness to remain in the country.”344 In this way, the Supreme
Court has already articulated a basic standard for assessing the substantive rationality
of immigration policies.
The concept of faithful execution advanced here, one rooted in good faith, rule of
law values, and rationality, does not require the President to adopt a particular set of
priorities, but it does not permit random, indiscriminate, or opaque enforcement. It
further requires the President to articulate and take responsibility for the way he or
she intends to manage enforcement realities.
C. Enforceability
This Article, at a minimum, seeks to elaborate on an underenforced constitutional
norm under the Take Care Clause, but to the extent that a court has authority to
review enforcement priorities, the judiciary can apply and implement the analysis
offered above. When an administration puts forward enforcement priorities that
effect a complete devolution or embody an irrational approach, a court can determine
that the administration has violated the Take Care Clause. One clear indication of
abdication would be enforcement priorities lacking a temporarily exempt class. The
Trump Administration balked at the notion that a deportable noncitizen should enjoy
a modicum of security. It instead emphasized that no one is exempt. But enforcement
priorities lacking a temporarily exempt class may insufficiently guide enforcement
officials about how to direct their efforts. Specifying an exempt class allows an

338. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1977) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448, 456 (1962)); see TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43708, THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE
AND EXECUTIVE DISCRETION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAW 26 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs
/misc/R43708.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GMU-NHFX].
339. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See GARVEY, supra note 338, at 13.
340. See Andrias, supra note 16, at 1117 (arguing for “disclosure of enforcement policy
decisions, accompanied by explanations rooted in law . . . .”).
341. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 59 (2011) (quoting Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.
2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 1947)).
342. Id. at 53, 58.
343. Id. at 55.
344. See id. at 53.

1374

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:1325

administration to easily demonstrate its adherence to faithful execution to show that
it has engaged in meaningful line drawing.
Discussion of the precise remedies that might be available for violation of the
Take Care Clause is beyond the scope of this Article, but a challenge to an
enforcement policy would likely fare better than an attempt to quash removal
proceedings against a specific noncitizen.345 As others have suggested, with respect
to a nonenforcement policy, a court could “simply invalidate the policy, or direct the
agency to reconsider its policy, without necessarily taking additional steps or
directing the agency to take any specific action.”346 An individual noncitizen might
not have an enforceable right to stop their own deportation. But they could potentially
challenge a policy, and a court could potentially invalidate the policy and direct the
agency to set priorities demonstrating good-faith line drawing.
CONCLUSION
In litigation and scholarship alike, the President’s role in overseeing the exercise
of immigration enforcement discretion has become more salient in recent years. Due
to the policies of the Obama Administration, the discourse has focused almost
exclusively on the constitutionality of presidential nonenforcement policies, based
on interpretations of the Take Care Clause. It has thus far avoided squarely evaluating
how enforcement against deportable noncitizens, if improperly or opaquely
undertaken, might also amount to abdication, despite its superficial fidelity to the
law. Building on recent scholarship in constitutional and administrative law, this
Article analyzes enforcement policy based on the structure of delegated discretion
and its fidelity to the core values of administrative law, including transparency and
accountability. It determines that two leading approaches to immigration
enforcement in recent years—total devolution and zero tolerance—fall short of
faithful execution.

345. Cf. WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION, supra note 111, at 124–25 (discussing range of
discretionary actions subject to judicial review apart from the three actions specifically
mentioned in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, or executing
removal orders).
346. GARVEY, supra note 338, at 26.

